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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, the Supreme Court limited the key prohibition con-
tained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' by holding that, under certain
circumstances, federal district courts may enjoin strikes in breach of
contract. 2
 Twice subsequently, the Court felt the need to resolve
controversies created by lower court attempts to fill the interstices of
this Boys Markets decision. 3 Yet many issues remain unresolved.
The most pressing question concerns district court jurisdiction to
issue an injunction requiring a union and its members to cross a
picket line pending arbitration of either the status of the picket line
or the members' right to respect the line. This term, the Court has
granted certiorari to consider the Second Circuit's holding that an
injunction may not issue to compel members to cross a picket line.
This term, as in the past, the Court has also denied certiorari where
courts have affirmed injunctions in similar circumstances. It there-
fore appears that the Court will adopt the position of the Third,
Fourth, and Eighth Circuits." Other questions involve the relation-
ship between bonding requirements and the restoration of the status
quo, and the applicability of the procedural safeguards contained in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 5
The theoretical aspects of the Boys Markets decision have al-
ready been canvassed in a comprehensive fashion. 6 The focus of this
article, therefore, will be on what the courts and labor practitioners
have, in fact, been doing. After summarizing the relevant legislative
history, this article will consider the Supreme Court decisions which
establish guidelines for the federal judiciary. Next, the approaches
utilized by federal courts in applying the various requirements im-
29 U.S.C. § 101-15 ( 1970).
2 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253.
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423 (1974); Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
See text at notes 206-44 infra.
5
 See text at notes 333-64 infra.
6
 See, e.g., Erdmann, Federal Courts May Enjoin Strikes Which Violate No-Strike
Clauses: Boys Markets vs. Retail Clerk's, 60 Ill. D.J. 548 (1972); Gould, On Labor Injunc-
tions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 215; Note, 12 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 295 (1970).
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posed by the Supreme Court, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be analyzed. The basic Boys
Markets decision will be accepted as a given. Where appropriate,
however, the article will evaluate subsequent decisions, emphasizing
their conformity to, or divergence from the national labor policy
underlying Boys Markets. The impact of these decisions upon the
strategy and tactics of labor practitioners will also be surveyed. In
sum, this article will explore the practical impact of the Boys Mar-
kets decisions.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
By 1932, decades of judicial abuse of the equity power forced
Congress to prohibit federal court issuance of injunctions in most
labor disputes.' Federal judges, sympathetic to management in-
terests,g had issued ex parte restraining orders based upon form
complaints accompanied by form affidavits. 9 Often, the injunctive
writs were drafted in broad, vague terms, restricting the use of
union strike fundsl° and the enforcement of union by-laws," and
depriving employees of the benefits of state laws' 2 and of free
speech. 13 These abuses could not be corrected at the permanent
injunction hearing or on appeal, for the severe impact of the tem-
porary order on union morale often made that order "all but deci-
sive.""
To correct these abuses, Congress adopted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." The statute was strictly drawn, for Congress
feared that judges would otherwise pervert the Act, as the courts
had previously emasculated the Clayton Act." The Norris-
7
 See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4505-06, 4509-10, 4620, 4624, 4689, 5478-81, 5490-98 (1932).
See, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4509-10, 4624, 4774, 4930, 5466, 5478-79 (1932).
9
 F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor Injunction 61-78, 200-03, 223 (1930) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Frankfurter & Greene].
" S. Rep. No. 163-1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4505-06, 5463,
5467, 5480-81 (1932); Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 9, at 103-04, 218.
" See, e.g., Borderland Coal Corp. v. UMW, 275 P. 871, 873 (D. Ind. 1921); 75 Cong.
Rec. 4509-10, 5490 (1932).
" S. Rep. No. 163-1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4624, 5467, 5481,
5513 (1932); Frankfurter & Greene, supra note 9, at 100-01.
13
 See, e.g., United States v, Taliaferro, 290 F. 214, 216 (W.D. Va. 1922), aff'd, 290 F.
906 (4th Cir. 1923); S. Rep. No. 163-1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1932); Frankfurter & Greene,
supra note 9, at 113.
14
 75 Cong. Rec. 4929, 4934 (1932); Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 Minn.
L. Rev. 638, 653 (1932).
15 29 U.S.C. § 101-10, 113-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Norris-LaGuardia Act]; 75
Cong. Rec. 5462-63, 5478-80, 5492 (1970).
19
 See Sinclair Refining Co. v, Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962); 29 U.S.C. § 105
(1970). Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), was the forerunner of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent, Trades Council, 257
U.S. 184 (1921), the Supreme Court held that § 20 and its prohibition of injunctive relief in
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LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining strikes or a
wide variety of supporting activity in most labor disputes.I 7 In cases
in which injunctive relief is permitted, the Act provides strict pro-
cedural safeguards." Congress also required jury trials in all con-
tempt actions arising under injunctions permitted by the Act."
Freed from judicial harassment, and later given affirmative support
in the National Labor Relations Act, 2 ° unions matured and pros-
pered.
As unions grew, so did criticism of unrestrained union power.
Among the most serious of union abuses was the violation of labor
agreements. In 1947, Congress amended the Labor Relations Act2 I
to proscribe union unfair labor practices. 22 The Senate bill also
declared unlawful any violation of "the terms of a collective bargain-
ing agreement or the terms of an agreement to submit a labor
dispute to arbitration." 23 That proposal was deleted from the final
version of the bill. The Conference Report stated that "[o]nce parties
have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that
contract should be left to the usual process of the law and not to the
National Labor Relations Board."24
Accordingly, section 301(a) of the Act provided that "[s]uits for
violation of contracts . . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States . . . "25 In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 26 the
Supreme Court held that section 301 authorized "federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements . . . "27 The Court further held that the
federal labor law permitted courts to compel the arbitration of
grievance disputes, despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act, since "Wile
any "dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment" between "employers and
employees" only applied to lawful union activity concerning a dispute with its own employer.
Id. at 202-03. The "lawfulness" of the activity was determined under pre-§ 20 standards,
making that provision a nullity. Id. at 203.
12
 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104-05 (1970).
16
 Id. §§ 107-10.
19 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1970).
2°
 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. H 151-68
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Labor Relations Act].
21 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-87 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Labor-Management Relations Act or Taft-Hartley Act].
22 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
23 S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(a)(6), 8(b)(5) (1947). See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, 23 (1947). The House bill contained a similar provision. H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947). See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947).
24
 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
25
 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as § 301].
26 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
22
 Id. at 451. The majority opinion, id. at 452-56, and Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion, id. at 485-546, contain extensive analysis of § 301's legislative history.
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failure to arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses against
which [that] Act was aimed."28
Several years later, employers began to bring suit in federal
courts to compel arbitration and, at the same time, enjoin strikes in
derogation of contractual arbitration systems. In Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 29 the Supreme Court held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prohibited such anti-strike injunctions. 30 The Court
found that in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had explicitly
declared the anti-injunction prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia to be
inapplicable in certain circumstances," and had rejected a proposal
to allow injunctive relief against union strikes in section 301 cases. 32
What Congress refused to do explicitly or by implication the Court
refused to do by "accommodation."" Justice Brennan dissented,
arguing that permitting the injunction would not unleash the judi-
cial abuse which necessitated the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 34
Opposition to Sinclair surfaced immediately. Within two
months, a resolution was introduced at the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association Section on Labor Relations Law seeking
the modification of Norris-LaGuardia in section 301 suits." At the
next meeting, the Section adopted the management resolution call-
ing for legislation to permit injunctions whenever a union struck in
breach of contract, after amending the management resolution to
forbid ex parte orders. 36 The Section also rejected an amendment
which would have permitted injunctive relief only if the strike
occurred over an arbitrable grievance. 37 Academic criticism came
more slowly, but no less vehemently."
Opposition to Sinclair produced no significant legislative re-
sponse. 39 It was, however, instrumental in producing judicial recon-
2" Id. at 458.
21' 370 U.S. 195 (1962),
30 Id. at 203.
31
 Id. at 204-05. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(h), 178(b) (1970).
32 370 U.S. at 205-09.
33 Id. at 209-10.
34
 Id. at 219.
35
 1 ABA Labor Relations Section 11-12 (1962).
36
 2 ABA Labor Relations Section 40-53, 226-44 (1963).
37 Id. at 49-52.
3 " See, e.g., Kiernan, Availability of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agree-
ments in Labor Contracts, 32 Albany L. Rev. 303 (1968); Wellington, The No-Strike Clause
and the Labor Injunction: Time for a Re-examination, 30 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 293 (1968);
Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process; A Comment on
Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 Yale L.J. 1547 (1963).
39
 In 1965, identical bills were introduced in the House and Senate. Each would have
amended section 301 to make the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable
in any proceeding to enjoin the violation of, or to enforce an arbitration award
arising out of an alleged violation of, [a labor agreement], if the contract includes: (i)
a provision for submission to binding arbitration of any claim asserted by such labor
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sideration of the availability of injunctive relief against strikes in
derogation of contractual arbitration agreements. 4 °
III. THE Boys Markets TRILOGY
A. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7704 '
Eight years later, with essentially the same facts before it, the
Supreme Court overruled Sinclair. The dispute arose when Local
770 alleged that a Boys Markets supervisor had infringed upon the
union's contractually preserved work jurisdiction. Local 770
threatened to strike unless the company used unit personnel to
perform the disputed work. 42 When the company refused to comply
with the union's demands, Local 770 struck and established a picket
line. The company then requested that the union comply with the
contract's grievance and arbitration provisions and that it terminate
the strike and picketing activities.43 When the strike continued the
next day, the company filed a complaint in California Superior
Court seeking a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and a
permanent injunction against the strike, and specific performance of
the contractual agreement to arbitrate. 44 The superior court issued
an ex parte temporary restraining order forbidding continuation of
the strike, and ordered the union to show cause why a preliminary
organization alleging a violation of such contract by such employer, and (ii) a
provision expressly stating that [the Norris-LaGuardia Act] shall be inapplicable in
any such proceeding.
S. 2132, H.R. 9059, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). It is unlikely that the amendment would
have had its intended effect, since few unions would waive the protection of the Act.
Subsequently, a bill was introduced to amend the Norris-LaGuardia Act to permit
injunctions enforcing a no-strike/no-lockout clause, without reference to an arbitrable griev-
ance. S. 2455, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
4° See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 249 n.18.
41 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
42
 Id. at 239. Specifically, the employer's frozen foods supervisor and several members of
his crew, who were not members of the bargaining unit, rearranged merchandise in frozen
food cases at one of the company's supermarkets. A union representative insisted that the
company use unit personnel to remove all merchandise from the cases, return the merchandise
to the main freezer in a storeroom, and then restock the cases. Id.
43
 Id. The "Adjustment and Arbitration" provision in their contract required either party
to notify the other regarding any controversy concerning the interpretation or application of
the agreement. If the parties failed to resolve a dispute, either party could submit the
controversy to arbitration before a single neutral arbitrator or before a panel composed of
equal numbers appointed by each party, with an impartial arbitrator as chairman. The
resulting award was final and binding on the parties, subject only to their rights under law.
During the period of adjustment or arbitration, the status quo was to be maintained pending
the ultimate resolution of the dispute. The contract further specified that there should be no
"cessation or stoppage of work, lockout, picketing or boycotts" over an arbitrable issue except
when a party refused to comply with the grievance procedure or to comply with an arbitration
award. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3072-73 (C.D. Cal.
1969). See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail'Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. -235, 238-39 nn.3-4 (1970).
44 398 U.S. at 239-40.
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injunction should not issue. 45 Shortly thereafter, the union removed
the case to federal district court and moved to quash the state
court's temporary restraining order. The company again sought to
enjoin the strike and to compel arbitration. Without an evidentiary
hearing, the district court denied the union's motion and granted the
company's applications for an injunction against the strike and for
an order compelling arbitration of the dispute "with diligence."'"
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "the clear language of.
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," as interpreted in Sinclair,
removes federal district court authority to enjoin strikes even though
they constitute a breach of contract. 47 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari" and reversed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan concluded that
"Sinclair stands as a significant departure from our otherwise con-
sistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote the peace-
ful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration . . ."49 The
majority concluded that Sinclair had undermined a cornerstone of
the federal labor policy—mandatory arbitration of grievances—by
dissipating employer incentive to accept arbitration clauses. 50 In
45 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, Civ. No. 948,323 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct., filed Feb. 19, 1969).
46
 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3075-76 (C.D. Cal,
1969). The district court found that (a) the contract required the submission of all disputes
concerning its interpretation to arbitration; (b) the contract contained an express no-strike
clause; (c) the Union breached the contract by striking over a dispute "of the type and
character" required to be arbitrated; (d) the strike had caused, and would continue to cause,
irreparable injury to the Company; (e) the Company would suffer more from the denial of an
injunction than the Union would suffer from its issuance; (1) the Company had no adequate
remedy at law because it was "impossible to ascertain the exact amount of damage"; and (g)
the Company had sought to arbitrate the dispute. Id. at 3074-75. The injunction was to
become effective when the Company filed a $1000 corporate surety bond. Id. at 3076.
47 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 416 F.2d 368, 369, 72 L.R.R.M. 2527,
2528 (9th Cir. 1969),
46 396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
" 398 U.S. at 241. Following the enactment of § 301, the Supreme Court had pointed to
the "basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process," Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962), and had uniformly required parties to
adhere to the grievance and arbitration provisions of their agreements. See, e.g., John Wiley
& Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566
(1960), the Court, in holding that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate a grievance
which the lower court had found to he "frivolous" and "patently baseless" and therefore not
subject to arbitration, pointed to § 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
173(d) (1970), prohibiting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service from attempting
to resolve an arbitrable dispute except as a "last resort" and in "exceptional circumstances,"
and stated that its policy "can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties for
settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play." 363
U.S. at 566. Similarly, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav, Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960), the Court lauded the arbitration process as "the very heart of the system of industrial
self-government." Id. at 581.
'° 398 U.S. at 248.
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order to preserve the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes, the contractual no-strike clauses which ordinarily accom-
pany arbitration clauses must be effectively enforced. 5 ' Although
other remedies exist for enforcement of the no-strike obligation, the
majority felt that injunctive relief was "the principal and most
expeditious" enforcement mechanism. 52
The Court also concluded in Boys Markets that its decision in
Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735 53 necessitated a reconsid-
eration of the practical effects of Sinclair." In Avco the Court had
held that section 301 actions are removable to federal courts. 55
prior decisions, however, the Court had held that while section 301
envisioned a substantive federal labor law, 56 state courts would
retain pre-existing jurisdiction, 57 applying the substantive federal
law developed under section 301 in order to maintain a uniform
system of labor law. 58 The result of Avco, when combined with the
decision in Sinclair that section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia precluded
federal courts from enjoining strikes in breach of contract, 59 was to
insure that unions would remove most injunctive suits from state
courts, where the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply, 60 to federal
courts in order to obtain dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief.
Faced with the dual objectives of preserving uniformity in the
federal and state forums and of maintaining concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction, the Court in Boys Markets found it necessary to
"accommodate" the literal terms of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act with its interpretations of the subsequently enacted section
301. 61 Justice Brennan also suggested that the judicial bias which
SI Id. at 249.
52 Id. at 248.
53 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
54
 398 U.S. at 244-45.
55 390 U.S. at 560.
56
 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
57
 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511 (1962).
SB
 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962).
59 370 U.S. at 209-10.
6o
	 American Dredging Co. v. Marine Operating Eng'rs Local 25, 338 F.2d 837, 855,
57 L.R.R.M. 2407, 2420 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965); McCarroll v.
Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 63, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932
(1958); Shaw Elec. Co. v. Local 98, IBEW, 418 Pa. 1, 13, 208 A.2d 769, 776 (1965). But see
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 376 F.2d 337, 342-43, 65 L.R.RM. 2193, 2196 (6th Cir.
1967), aff 'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The Supreme Court in Avco specifically reserved the
question of the applicability of Norris-LaGuardia in state courts. 390 U.S. at 560 n,2.
" 398 U.S. at 250. A similar conflict exists between § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
a provision in the Railway Labor Act allowing compulsory arbitration of certain minor
disputes at the request of either party. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (First) (i), (m) (1970). In Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), the Court accommo-
dated those conflicting provisions by holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prohibit
enjoining strikes over "minor disputes." Id. at 40. The Court concluded that minor disputes
fall within the jurisdiction of the Railway Adjustment Board and that injunctive relief is
900
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necessitated Norris-LaGuardia no longer existed. 62 The Supreme
Court held, therefore, that "the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar
the granting of injunctive relief in the circumstances of the instant
case." 63 In its "narrow" 64 holding, the Court specified several sub-
stantive prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction despite the
proscription of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
1. The contract contains a no-strike clause; 65
2. A breach of the no-strike clause is occurring and will con-
tinue, or has been threatened and will be committed;66
3. The collective bargaining agreement contains a "mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure;" 67
4. The strike is "over a grievance which both parties are con-
tractually bound to arbitrate ; 1 ' 68
5. The employer is "ready to proceed with arbitration at the
time an injunction [is] . . . sought and obtained;" 69
6. The breach has caused or will cause irreparable injury to the
employer;70
7. "[T]he employer will suffer more from the denial of an
injunction than will the union from its issuance;" 7 ' and
8. The employer must be ordered to arbitrate "as a condition of
his obtaining an injunction against the strike.""
The Court explicitly overruled Sinclair" and, because the district
court had made the necessary findings, ordered the Ninth Circuit to
affirm the district court's issuance of an injunction. 74
B. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers"
Boys Markets presented a simple case involving an express
no-strike clause and a strike over an indisputably arbitrable
economic grievance. 76 None of these factors were present in Gate-
way, the next Boys Markets case to reach the Supreme Court.
necessary to protect the Board's jurisdiction. Id. at 39. "Major disputes" are not subject to
compulsory arbitration, and strikes over such disputes cannot be enjoined. Railroad Tele-
graphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 335, 341 (1960).
62 398 U.S. at 250.
63 Id. at 253.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 248 n.16, 254.
66
 Id. at 254.
67 Id. at 253.
66 Id. at 254.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73
 Id. at 238.
74 Id. at 254-55.
76 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
76 398 U.S. at 248 n.16, 254.
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The dispute in Gateway arose following the discovery of a
partial blockage in the ventilation system of an underground coal
mine." Federal and state investigators determined that three assis-
tant foremen had falsified records to conceal the problem." When
miners refused to work with them, Gateway suspended the three."
Approximately six weeks later, the state Department of Mines no-
tified the company that it could reinstate the assistant foremen de-
spite pending criminal charges. 8° When Gateway reinstated two of
the foremen, the miners struck." One week later, the union rejected
Gateway's offer to arbitrate the dispute. 82
Gateway sought a restraining order and a preliminary injunc-
tion against the strike in federal district court. In its order, the
district court instructed the parties to arbitrate whether the miners
should work with the offending foremen; pending arbitration, the
court ordered Gateway to suspend the assistant fOremen. 83 The
court rejected the union's argument that the dispute was not arbi-
trable. 84 The national agreement executed by the parties was inter-
preted as requiring that all non-national disputes be settled through
a grievance system culminating in arbitration. 85 Since the contract
established a local employee mine safety committee with authority
to close the mine in immediately dangerous circumstances, since
members of the committee could be removed for arbitrarily closing
the mine, and since their removal would create a non-national
arbitrable grievance, the district court concluded that the union had
agreed to arbitrate safety disputes."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed that determination." In vacating the district court's order,
the court held that the contract did not unambiguously require
mandatory arbitration of safety disputes." The contract did not
specify the arbitration of safety disputes and neither party could
recall a prior instance in which a safety dispute had been arbi-
77 414 U.S. at 371.
7° Id.
79 Id. at 371-72.
80 Id. at 372. The foremen subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to misdemeanor
charges and were fined $200 each. Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. 2633, 2634 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (temporary
restraining order). While the union's appeal was pending, the arbitrator rejected the union's
contention that the retention of the foremen, with safety responsibilities, would be dangerous.
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1158, 80 L.R.R.M. 3153 (3d Cir. 1972).
"Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. 2634, 2635 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (preliminary
injunction).
55 Id.
86 Id.
37 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 80 L.RRM. 3153 (3d Cir. 1972).
88 Id. at 1159, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3154.
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trated. 89 The court refused to apply a presumption of arbitrability, 9°
holding that disputes concerning health and safety were "sui
generis," that is, qualitatively different from other types of local
disputes, and that an ambiguous arbitration clause should not be
construed to require mandatory arbitration of safety disputes. 91 The
court also suggested that Boys Markets was limited to cases involv-
ing economic disputes. 92
In reversing the Third Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court
refined three important aspects of the Boys Markets decision. First,
the Court concluded that a "presumption of arbitrability" 93 would
apply in Boys Markets cases, including cases involving safety dis-
putes." The Court then found that the mine safety committee
69 Id.
9° Id. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), the
Supreme Court held that "[On the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration can prevail . . ." Id. at 584-85. The applicability of the presumption of
arbitrability announced in Warrior & Gulf to Boys Markets injunction cases has been a matter
of much debate. See text at notes 168-204 infra.
9 466 F.2d at 1159-60, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3154-55. Writing for the majority, Judge Elastic
recognized that the duty to arbitrate and the obligation not to strike are interrelated and
reasoned that § 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act, providing that "the quitting of labor by . .
employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at . , . [their]
place of employment . . . [shall not] be deemed a strike," 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970), "should
influence a court to reject any avoidable [contract] construction ... requiring final disposition
of safety disputes by arbitration." 466 F.2d at 1160, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3155. Significantly, the
court appeared to apply a subjective test of employee "good faith." See id, The NLRB has
also held that walkouts to protest unsafe working conditions are protected, notwithstanding
contractual arbitration and no-strike clauses. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 138 N.L.R. B.
737, 739, 51 L.R.R.M. 1130, 1131 (1962), enforced, 330 F.2d 492, 495, 497, 55 L.R.R.M.
2889, 2890, 2892 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 833, 841; Knight Morley Corp., 116
N.L.R.B. 140, 146-47, 38 L.R.R.M. 1194, 1195-96 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753, 760, 41
L.R.R.M. 2242, 2247 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927.(1958). The Board, however,
has adopted an objective test that the conditions must, in fact, be abnormally dangerous,
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1209, 47 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1471 (1961), as has the
Eighth Circuit, NLRB v. Fruin-Colrion Const. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 892, 56 L.R.R.M. 2048,
2054 (8th Cir. 1964).
In his dissent from the Third Circuit's decision in Gateway, Judge Rosenn pointed out
that (I) the safety issue was not raised until the union struck over the company's refusal to pay
employees who failed to work the day the dangerous conditions existed; (2) there was no
objective evidence that abnormally dangerous conditions existed; and (3) the district court's
injunction maintained safe conditions by suspending the supervisors pending arbitration to
determine whether they could safely be reinstated. 466 F.2d at 1161-63, 80 L.R.R.M. at
3156-57 (dissenting opinion). The majority responded to Judge Rosenn's third argument by
stating that employees should not be forced to risk their lives on the arbitrator's judgment.
466 F.2d at 1160, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3155.
92
 466 F.2d at 1160 n.1, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3155 n.l.
93 See note 90 supra.
" Gateway Coal Co, v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1974). The Court reasoned that
safety disputes may create industrial strife, that arbitrators have special expertise in the safety
field, and that releasing safety disputes to the arena of economic combat would not ensure
employee safety but would rather make safety dependent upon the union's economic strength,
Id. at 379.
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procedure present in Gateway did not constitute an express excep-
tion to the arbitration system. 95
 The Court also held that federal
courts had jurisdiction to grant an injunction on the basis of an
implied no-strike clause and that a no-strike clause should be im-
plied, coterminous with the arbitration clause, absent an express
provision to the contrary. 96 Finally, the Court stated that "a work
stoppage called solely to protect employees from immediate danger
is authorized by § 502 and cannot be the basis for either a damages
award or a Boys Markets injunction" despite the presence of an
express or implied no-strike clause." However, the Court concluded
that this statutory exception was inapplicable where, as in Gateway,
the union had failed to present "ascertainable, objective evidence
supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous condition
for work exists."98 The Court emphasized that, in any event, the
district court order suspending the foremen pending arbitration had
obviated any immediate danger. 99
After Gateway, the substantive requirements imposed by Boys
Markets were thus amended to permit an injunction where:
1.(a) The contract contains a no-strike clause, either express or
implied;
(b) The strike is not over an objectively ascertainable threat
to employee safety;
	
.	 .	 .
	
4.	 The strike is over a grievance which is arguably arbitra-
ble under the contract between the parties;
C. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70' 00
The third case in the Supreme Court Boys Markets trilogy
involved the effect of removal to a federal court on an injunction
issued in a state court. Although not directly a Boys Markets case,
Granny Goose is significant because Boys Markets cases can origi-
nate in state courts.'°' The Court's decision in Granny Goose may
profoundly affect the choice of forum in Boys Markets situations.
95 Id. at 380 n.10.
96
 Id. at 381-82. In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the
Court held that a strike over a dispute subject to mandatory arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement constitutes a breach of that agreement, despite the absence of an
express no-strike clause, and subjects the Union to liability for damages in a 301 suit. Id. at
104-05. Gateway extended the Lucas Flour doctrine to suits for injunctive relief. 414 U.S. at
381.
97 414 U.S. at 385.
98
 Id. at 387.
99 Id.
16° 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
'°' Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962).
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The dispute apparently involved the union's contention that its
members were not covered by a multi-union, multi-employer collec-
tive bargaining agreement recently signed by the employer and that
no binding labor agreement existed between the parties)° 2 When
the union struck, the employer obtained an ex parte restraining
order and a show cause order in state court on May 15, 1970. 103
Both orders were returnable on May 26, when each would expire. 1 °4
On May 19, the union removed the case to federal court, where it
moved to dissolve the order on the basis of the Sinclair decision.'° 5
On June 4, three days after the Supreme Court overruled Sinclair in
Boys Markets, the court denied the union's motion to dissolve. 106
Neither the union nor the employer filed further motions in the case.
Strike activity then ceased."'
On November 30, 1970, the union resumed the strike.'" Re-
jecting the union's contention that the order had expired, the district
court held the union in contempt.'" Since section 1450 of the
Judicial Code provides that removed orders remain in force until
dissolved or modified, the court reasoned that the state order re-
mained in force in light of the district court's failure to dissolve the
state court's order.'" The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
order issued by the state court and upheld by the district court had
long since expired."' The court concluded that a district court must
treat a removed order (1) as if it had issued the order at the time the
state court acted, in which case the federal time limitation ex parte
restraining orders contained in Federal Rule 65(a) would apply, or
(2) as if state law governed. 112 In either case, the court seemed
willing to allow the maximum extension provided by either body of
law.'" However, section 1450, the court reasoned, merely insures
I" 415 U.S. at 427-28.
103 Id. at 428.
104 Id. California law provides that an ex parte restraining order must be returnable
within 15 days, or within 20 clays if good cause is shown. Unless the party obtaining the order
then obtains a preliminary injunction, the restraining order is dissolved. Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 527 (West Supp. 1975).
105 415 U.S. at 428.
106 Id. at 429.
107 id .
108 Id. at 430.
109 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70, 76 L.R.R.M. 2412, 2414 (N.D.
Cal. 1970).
110 Id. at 2414. Section 1450 provides, in pertinent part, that "[al injunctions, orders
and other proceedings had, in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and
effect until dissolved or modified by the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970).
111 Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70, 472 F.2d 764, 766-67, 82
L.R.R.M. 2545, 2546-47 (9th Cir. 1973).
112 Id. at 765-67, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2546-47. Rule 65(b) permits an exparte order to last 10
days, with an extension if good cause is shown or if the defendant consents. Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b).
113 472 F.2d at 765-66, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2546.
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that a state order survives removal, and does not add to the dura-
tion of the order.'" Finally, the court held that the denial of a
motion to dissolve a temporary order is not the functional equivalent
of the issuance of a preliminary injunction." 5
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
[ajn ex parte temporary restraining order issued by a state
court prior to removal remains in force after removal no
longer than it would have remained in effect under state
law, but in no event does the order remain in force longer
than the time limitations imposed by Rule 65(b) measured
from the date of removal." 6
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however, the Court indicated that the
district court must expressly extend a state order if it is to remain
effective longer than 10 days." 7 Similarly, the Court held that any
grant of a preliminary injunction by a district court must be express
and cannot be implied from the denial of a union's motion to
dissolve a temporary order, thereby requiring the employer to prove
its right to injunctive relief rather than forcing the union to disprove
it." 8
IV. THE APPLICATION OF Boys Markets IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Federal courts have based innumerable decisions upon Boys
Markets." 9
 The following analysis of the more than one hundred
cases reported by April, 1975 is divided into three general
categories: (a) the substantive requirements of Boys Markets; (b) the
substantive requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act; and (c) the
procedural framework of the injunction process.
114
 Id. at 766-67, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2546-47.
' " Id. at 767, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2547. In a similar Boys Markets case, the Second Circuit
had held that "the practical effect of the refusal to dissolve the temporary restraining order
was the equivalent of a grant of preliminary injunctive relief." Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450
F.2d 97, 99, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2712 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972). There
the employer had obtained a state court ex parte restraining order on March 1 effective until a
hearing scheduled on March 3. After removal, on March 9, the federal district court heard the
union's motion to vacate and on March 23 denied the motion. Id. at 98-99, 78 L.R.R.M. at
2711.
116 Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 439-40 (footnote omitted),
117 See id. at 440 n,15.
116 Id. at 442-43.
119 Of the 142 labor practitioners responding to a survey in September and December,
1973, several had participated in more than 100 Bays Markets cases.
A computer printout analyzing the survey responses is available at the offices of the
Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. Obviously, the reported cases
represent merely the tip of the iceberg.
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A. The Substantive Requirements of Boys Markets
1. An Actual or Threatened Strike in Breach of Contract
a. A Labor Dispute. The Norris-LaGuardia Act restricts the
issuance of certain injunctions and restraining orders by federal
courts in the broad class of cases "involving or growing out of a
labor dispute. " 120 Labor disputes are statutorily defined to include
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiat-
ing, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the dispu-
tants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 121
In the overwhelming majority of cases, trial courts either failed to
consider this threshold issue, the existence of a "labor dispute," or
merely cited the broad statutory definition in the Act before proceed-
ing into their analysis of the Bays Markets exception. 122
On the other hand, several employers have successfully argued
that essentially "political" union activity, protesting governmental
action or inaction and not intended to alter terms and conditions of
employment, does not constitute a "labor dispute" and is thus un-
protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 23
b. An Actual or Threatened Strike in Breach of Contract.
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act proscribes the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders which prohibit any persons in-
terested in a labor dispute, whether acting singly or in concert, from
striking, peacefully picketing, or nonfraudulently publicizing a labor ,
120 29 U.S.C. §1 101, 104, 107, 109-10 (1970).
12 ' Id. § 113(c). The jurisdiction of the NLRB is similarly defined. Id. § 152(9), 160(a).
t22 See, e.g.
, Port of Houston Auth. v. Masters, Mates & Pilots, 456 F.2d 50, 51, 79
L.R.R.M. 2789, 2790 (5th Cir. 1972) (statutory definition cited without discussion); Harmony
Dairy Co. v. Teamsters Local 205, 82 L.R.R M. 2773, 2778 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (Norris-
LaGuardia and applicability of Boys Markets exception discussed without consideration of the
presence of a labor dispute).
123 See United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 74 L.R.R.M. 2611, 2613 (3d Cir. 1970);
Harrington & Co. v. Local 1416, ILA, 356 F. Supp. 1079, 1081-83, 84 L.R.R.M. 2821,
2825-26 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (motion to clarify); Harrington & Co. v. Local 1416, ILA, 84
L.R.R.M. 2821, 2822 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (preliminary injunction); United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 77 L.R.R.M. 3134, 3135 (E.D. Ky. 1971). One district court found no "labor dispute"
where a union struck to compel employer compliance with wage provisions not validated by
the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee, Colonial Sand & Stone Co. v. Geoghegan,
367 F. Supp. 932, 935-36, 84 L.R.R.M. 2678, 2681 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Under almost identical
circumstances, an appellate court rejected that conclusion, despite the lack of real disagree-
ment between the union and employer. McGuire Shaft & Tunnel Corp. v. Local 1791, UMW,
475 F.2d 1209, 1215 n.12 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 958 (1973).
An employer may also avoid the restrictions of the Act by demonstrating that the
offending employees do not constitute a "labor organization." Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Disabled Miners, 328 F. Supp. 1248, 1251-52, 77. L.R.R.M. 2948, 2950-51 (S.D.W. Va.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (4th Cir. 1971).
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dispute, or from promoting such activity. 124 Boys Markets creates an
exception to the limitation imposed upon federal courts by section 4
only when there is an actual or threatened strike in breach of
contract.'" Approximately 99 percent of all collective bargaining
agreements include express no-strike provisions of variable scope, or
grievance or grievance-arbitration provisions creating implied no-
strike clauses. 128
Courts have properly issued injunctions with scant reference to
a no-strike clause.' 27 Although Boys Markets itself dealt only with
an express no-strike clause, the Court implied that an injunction
would be appropriate where a strike breached an implied no-strike
clause coextensive with the duty to arbitrate, since the focus of the
Boys Markets injunction is on the agreement to arbitrate rather than
on any agreement not to strike. 128 Three years later, in Gateway,
the Court expressly held that no-strike clauses should be implied in
injunction cases,' 29 a result which district courts had accurately
predicted even before Gateway.I 3 °
124
 29 U.S.C. §§ 104(a), (c1) -(j) (1970).
tas 398 U.S. at 254. The type of activity which constitutes a breach of a no-strike
obligation has been broadly interpreted to include any "attempt by the Union to retard
production or to interrupt or interfere with work." Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d
968, 974, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290, 2294 (3d Cir. 1972). Thus courts have enjoined total strikes,
e.g., Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253-54, overtime boycotts where overtime is normally relied
upon by management, Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974, 80 L.R.R.M.
2290, 2294 (3d Cir. 1971); Elevator Mfrs. Ass'n v. Elevator Constrs. Local 1, 342 F. Supp.
372, 374, 80 L,R.R.M. 2165, 2166-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and slowdowns, Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Printing Pressmen Local 9, 75 L.R.R.M. 2800 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
Once the court enjoins a strike, it may also enjoin a wide variety of collateral activity,
including picketing, interference with the employer's operations and promoting of such
activities. See Boys Markets, 398 U,S. at 240. However, where there is no strike or threatened
strike, the court will not enjoin peaceful picketing by laid-off employees. MacFadden-Bartell
Corp. v. Teamsters Local 1034, 345 F. Supp. 1286, 1289-90, 80 L.R.R.M. 3234, 3137
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Cf. Stereotypers' Union v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 79
L.R.R.M. 2284, 2291 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). It appears that no court has been asked to enjoin
picketing by employees on their own time.
126
 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 1425-6, Major Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreements: Arbitration Procedures 86-89 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bull.
1425-61. Ninety percent of all labor agreements contained express no-strike clauses while 9%
contained arbitration procedures giving rise to an implied no-strike clause. Id. at 86. See note
96 supra and accompanying text.
127
 Several courts did not discuss the no-strike obligation at all. See, e.g., American Can
Co. v. Steelworkers Local 7420, 350 F. Supp. 810, 81 L.R.R.M. 2706 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Printing Pressmen, 78 L.R.R.M. 2528 (W.D, Pa. 1971); Stearns-
Roger Corp. v. Millwrights Local 1182, 77 L,R.R.M. 2776 (D. Ariz. 1971); American Can
Co. v. International Bhd. of Pulp Workers, 77 L.R.R.M. 2633 (D. Ore. 1971).
125
 See 398 U.S. at 248 n.16, 253-54.
129
 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974).
13° See, e.g., MacFadden-Bartell Corp. v. Teamsters Local 1034, 345 F. Supp. 1286,
1289, 80 L,R.R.M. 3234, 3237 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lanco Coal Co. v. Southern Coal Local 250,
320 F. Supp. 273, 275 n.2, 76 L.R.R.M. 2249, 2250 n.2 (N.D. Ala. 1970). Cf. NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 335, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2055 (3d Cir.
1974) (dissenting opinion).
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No-strike clauses should not, however, be implied too readily.
As Justice Black stated in his dissent in Teamsters Local 174
v. Lucas Flour Co., 131 since employers regularly bargain for ex-
press no-strike clauses, the absence of such an express clause may
indicate that the parties have considered and rejected its inclu-
sion.' 32 Courts should scrutinize the parties' real intent and not
ignore the contractual bargaining obligation by applying a rigid rule
of law.'" The Court itself has subsequently lent credence to Justice
Black's position by cautioning against an "inflexible rule rigidly
linking no-strike and arbitration clauses of every collective bargain-
ing contract in every situation." 34
Thus, in several instances, courts have paused to consider the
parties' negotiating history. Where a union has expressly rejected an
explicit no-strike clause, courts have refused "to hold that the Union
unwittingly surrendered what it expressly showed that it intended to
keep." 135 Conversely, some courts have read an express reservation
of the right to strike as applying only to national disputes and have
implied a no-strike clause for "non-national disputes," particularly
in cases involving National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements.' 36
Similarly, where the parties have bargained for an express
no-strike clause narrower than the arbitration provisions, a broader
no-strike clause should not ordinarily be implied.'" When, how-
ever, the parties have agreed to arbitrate all disputes, but have also
agreed that the no-strike clause is inapplicable when the employer
violates the collective bargaining agreement, some courts have been
willing to issue injunctions, reasoning that such clauses undermine
the arbitration system and requiring that the employers' alleged
violation itself be arbitrated.' 38 A more reasonable interpretation of
131 369 U,S. 95 (1962).
133 Id, at 109-10.
133 See id,
134 Drake Bakeries, Inc, v. Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S, 254, 261 (1962). The
Court warned that previous decisions did not "enunciate a flat and general rule that the two
clauses are properly to be regarded as exact counterweights in every industrial setting . . ."
Id. at 261 n.7. See Packinghouse Workers Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247,
251 (1964).
133 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Communications Workers, 78 L.R.R.M. 2213, 2214
(W.D,N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 456 F.2d 1057, 1058, 79 L.R.R.M.
2770 (2d Cir. 1972); accord, Martin Hageland, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 460 F.2d 789,
791 (9th Cir. 1972).
135 See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162, 163-64, 78
L.R.R.M. 2845, 2847 (7th Cir. 1972).
137 See NLRB v. State Elec. Serv., Inc., 477 F.2d 749, 751, 82 L.R.R.M. 3154, 3156
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911 (1973).
131 Allied Div. of Del. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Operating Engineers Local 542, 351 F.
Supp, 568, 571, 82 L.R.R.M. 2078, 2079-80 (D. Del. 1972); Elevator Mfrs. Ass'n v. Elevator
Constrs, Local 1, 331 F. Supp. 165, 166, 78 L.R.R.M. 2215, 2216, (S.D.N.Y. 1971). One
study revealed that 2.9 percent of contracts examined in 1961-1962 provided for a waiver of
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these clauses would permit the union to strike only if the employer
refuses to rectify a proven breach of contract.' 39 That construction,
while departing from the contract's literal language, is far more
consistent with national labor policy and with the parties' presumed
desire to arbitrate most disputes.
Finally, no injunction should issue, despite the presence of a
broad no-strike clause, when the dispute underlying the strike is not
arbitrable. ' 40
2. A Mandatory Grievance or Arbitration Procedure
Boys Markets applies only where the collective bargaining ag-
reement contains a "mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration
procedure." 141 In Boys Markets, while only the union could initiate
grievances, either party could submit unresolved disputes to arbitra-
tion. 142
 The contract provided that "rainy and all matters of con-
troversy . . . shall be settled and resolved" through the grievance
procedure and expressly prohibited strikes over arbitrable dis-
putes.'" Where a similar combination exists—grievance initiation
only by the union, arbitration submission by either party and an
express no-strike clause—courts have routinely found the clauses to
be mandatory. 144
 Few agreements, however, contain such specific
provisions. 145
Courts have unanimously held that provisions requiring mutual
consent for the submission to arbitration are not mandatory, reason-
the no-strike clause if the employer breaches any provision of the contract. Bull. 1425-6, supra
note 125, at 86-89.
139 Cf. McNally Bros. v. Teamsters Local 816, 376 F. Supp. 612, 613, 85 L.R.R.M.
2897, 2898 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), where the contract expressly permitted a strike if the employer
failed to comply with an arbitral award within 10 days. Approximately 13.5 percent of the
contracts surveyed by BLS contained such exceptions. Bull. 1425-6, supra note 125, at 88.
1" See text at notes 166-205 infra.
141 398 U.S. at 253. See Teamsters Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 370
U.S. 711, 711-12 (1962) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see L.A. Concrete
Pumping, Inc. v. Majich, 483 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (dissenting opinion).
142 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3073-74 (C.D.
Cal. 1969).
143
 398 U.S. at 238 n.3, 239 n.4.
144 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewers and Maltsters Local 6, 346 F. Supp. 239,
241.42, 80 L.R.R.M. 2915, 2917 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
145 The BLS found that "some" contracts permit the employer to initiate grievances.
U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 1425-1, Major Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Grievance Procedures 20 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bull. 1425-1].
Fifteen percent of the contracts studied prohibited strikes over arbitrable grievances and
contained arbitration clauses covering all disputes concerning the application and interpreta-
tion of the agreement, with or without specified exceptions. Bull. 1425-6, supra note 126, at
86. Either party may invoke the arbitration clause in 80.4 percent of the contracts studied and
in 89.6 percent of the contracts containing arbitration clauses. Id. at 27.
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ing that Boys Markets applies only to institutionalized arbitration
procedures and not to such an ad hoc arrangement.'"
Several district courts have held that "employee-oriented"
grievance-arbitration provisions under which the employer may
neither initiate grievances nor refer unresolved disputes to arbitra-
tion, are not mandatory. 147 Thus, they have viewed such provisions
as failing to satisfy the core requirement of Boys Markets and have
refused to enjoin the union's decision to use economic coercion
rather than invoke the grievance system. The Third Circuit, how-
ever, rejected that conclusion in Avco Corp. v. Auto Workers Local
787, 148 stating:
All that Boys Markets requires is that "both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate." It does not require that
both parties be capable of initiating arbitration. In this
case, the company is bound to arbitrate if the Union elects
to pursue that remedy, and the Union is bound to arbitrate
the disputes it desires to resolve rather than to resort to a
strike. . . . To allow the Union to abandon its remedy of
arbitration in order to disregard the "no-strike" clause
would render the collective bargaining agreement illusory
and would subvert the policy favoring the peaceful settle-
ment of labor disputes by arbitration.' 49
That reasoning is convincing where the contract states that all
unresolved disputes "shall" be submitted to arbitration' 5° or where
the union "may" refer disputes to arbitration but has expressly
149 Womeldorf, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 110, 369 F. Supp. 901, 904-05 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf. of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324, 1326,
1328-29, 79 L.R.RM 2555, 2556, 2558-59 (7th Cir. 1972); Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d
97, 102, 103, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2113-14 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
Cf. Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 106 n.1, 79 L.R.R.M, 1265, 1267
(1972), enforced, 84 L.R.R.M. 2300 (10th Cir. 1973). Approximately 2.7 percent of the'
contracts in the BLS sample require mutual consent to invoke arbitration. Bull. 1425-6, supra
note 126, at 27.
147 Kable Printing Co. v. Machinists Lodge 101, 359 F. Supp. 265, 267, 84 L.R.R.M.
2785, 2786 (N.D. El. 1973); Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 325 F. Supp. 588, 590-91, 595,
77 L.R.R.M. 2014, 2015-16, 2019 (M.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 968, 972-73, 80 L,R.R.M.
2290, 2293-94 (3d Cir. 1972); Stroehmann Bros. v. Confectionery Workers Local 427, 315 F.
Supp, 647, 650-51, 74 L,R.R.M. 2957, 2959-60 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
1 " 459 F.2d 968, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290 (3d Cir. 1972).
149 Id. at 972, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2293 (citations omitted); accord, Monongahela Power Co.
v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84 L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973); Geo. A.
Hormel & Co. v. Meat Cutters Local P-31, 349 F. Supp. 785, 788-89, 81 L.R.R.M. 2500,
2502-03 (N.D. Iowa 1971); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810,
81344, 79 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2426-27 (E.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373
(5th Cir. 1972).
1S0 See Stein Printing Co. v. Typographers Local 48, 329 F. Supp, 754, 756 n.5, 758, 77
L.R.R.M. 3084, 3085 n.5, 3086 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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agreed not to strike.' 5 ' In the latter situation the union has discre-
tion to pursue its claim to arbitration but has expressly waived the
right to strike if it decides not to arbitrate. However, where the
union "may" refer a dispute to arbitration, but has not expressly
waived the right to strike, this logic is compelling only if the no-
strike clause is implied. 152
 Thus, the existence of a no-strike obliga-
tion may be the key to finding a mandatory arbitration system.'"
The preceding analysis has assumed the existence of an arbitra-
tion provision. Some courts have seized upon the Court's disjunctive
phrasing, "grievance adjustment or arbitration provision," 154
 to
conclude that a mandatory grievance procedure alone is sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief.' 55
 Once the union has exhausted its con-
tractual grievance remedies, however, courts have refused to issue
injunctions against strikes and have dissolved those previously is-
sued.' 56
 These decisions to enjoin strikes pending exhaustion of the
' 5 ' Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 813-14, 79
L.R.R.M. 2425, 2426-27. (E.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir.
1972). See generally Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewery Drivers Local 133, 346 F. Supp. 702,
705-06, 81 L.R.R.M. 2673, 2674-75 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewers and
Malisters Local 6, 346 F. Supp. 239, 242, 80 L.R.R.M. 2915, 2917 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
"2
 If the waiver is express, a mandatory arbitration system is readily found. Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 814, 79 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2427 (E.D.
La.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972). If, however, there is no
express no-strike clause, it may be more difficult to find a mandaotry system. Some courts
have been willing to infer a no-strike clause and find a mandatory system without hesitation.
See Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Meat Cutters Local P-31, 349 F. Supp. 785, 788-89, 80
L.R.R.M. 2500, 2502-03 (N.D. Iowa 1972); MacFadden-Bartell Corp. v. Teamsters Local
1034, 345 F. Supp, 1286, 1289, 80 L.R.R.M. 3234, 3237 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Others, however,
have refused to infer a no-strike clause. See Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Communications Work-
ers, 78 L.R.R.M. 2213, 2214 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 456 F.2d
1057, 1058, 79 L.R.R.M. 2770 (2d Cir. 1972).
US
 To avoid injunctions, several unions have argued that their arbitration provisions are
not mandatory. These unions risk pyhrric victories: if the court finds that the clause is not
mandatory, the union cannot subsequently compel the employer to arbitrate other, less impor-
tant, disputes. This reduces the union to costly § 301 litigation, an unwanted and possible
futile strike, or capitulation on a series of minor disputes. Unions which intentionally omit
mandatory arbitration procedures fully understand the implications; unions which invalidate
their agreements to win short-term litigation victories may later regret their tactics.
134
 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added).
" 3
 See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 814 n.5,
79 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2427 n.5 (E.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th
Cir. 1972).
154
 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf. of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324,
1329, 79 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2559 (7th Cir. 1972); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters Union, 353
F. Supp. 869, 872, 81 L.R.R.M. 2207, 2209 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
In General Elec. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 919, 398 U.S. 436 (1970), however,
decided two weeks after the Boys Markets decision, the Supreme Court remanded, without
opinion, a Fifth Circuit decision affirming a district court decision to dissolve a state court
injunction and deny a preliminary injunction, even though the parties had stipulated that the
underlying dispute was not arbitrable and that the grievance procedure had been exhausted.
General Elec. Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 919, 413 F.2d 964, 965-66, 79 L.R.R.M. 2903,
2903-04 (5th Cir. 1969). The reasoning suggested above would have required affirmance.
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grievance procedure reflect the national labor policy of enforcing
any method the parties have chosen to resolve their disputes.'"
Expiration of a contract does not necessarily preclude the is-
suance of an injunction. A valid contract containing a mandatory
arbitration system is normally essential for a Boys Markets injunc-
tion. 158
 Nevertheless, a court may order arbitration pursuant to an
expired contract when the grievance concerns rights accruing under
that agreement, 159
 even though the strike may commence after
expiration of the contract.' 6° On the other hand, where the dispute
itself arises after the expiration of the contract, no injunction should
issue.'" Several courts have mistakenly denied injunctive relief
because arbitration cannot be completed before the expiration of a
contract' 62 or issued an injunction effective only until the expiration
of a current agreement.' 63
 Courts should not assume that the ensu-
ing agreement will resolve all unsettled grievances,t 64
 or conclude
that the contract's expiration invalidates accrued rights. Rather, the
injunction should extend until the grievance is arbitrated or aban-
doned.
Disputes involving the existence of a binding agreement pose a
related problem. Where the existence of a binding agreement is the
157 See Truck Drivers Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963).
I s m See Bays Markets, 398 U.S. at 253-54.
159
 See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548, 551 (1964); Holly Sugar
Corp. v. Distillery Workers Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903-04, 71 L.R.R.M. 2841, 2844 (9th Cir.
1969); Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6, 10, 65 L.R.R.M. 2273, 2276-77 (2d
Cir. 1967). Cf. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
{1960), where the Court reversed an appellate court decision to deny enforcement of an
arbitrator's award on the grounds that back pay beyond the expiration date of the contract
had been awarded.
16" Kauai Elec. Co. v. Local 1260, IBEW, 79 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2842-43 (D. Hawaii
1971); cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 454 F.2d 1333, 1334, 78
L.R.R.M. 2833, 2833-34 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Pullman, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 354 F. Supp. 496, 497-98, 82 L.R.RM. 2638, 2639-40 (E.D. Pa. 1972), In
Pullman, the court refused to enjoin a post-expiration strike over an apparently pre-expiration
grievance; the court also dissolved a state court injunction issued five days before the
contract's expiration. Id. at 498, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2640. Assuming that the strike did not
involve the negotiation of the next agreement, the court erred.
' 6 ' See Procter & Gamble Ind. Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg, Co., 312 F.2d 181, 186
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 {1963). Herald Co. v. Hopkins, 325 F. Supp. 1232,
1234, 77 L.R.R.M. 2199, 2200-01 (N.D,N.Y. 1971).
' 62
 See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 324 F. Supp. 830, 833,
76 L.R.R.M. 3032, 3034 (S.D. Tex.), rev'd, 454 F.2d 1333, 78 L.R.R.M. 2833 (5th Cir.
1971).
165
 See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 77 L.R.R.M. 3134, 3136 (E.D. Ky.
1971); Hilton Int'l Co. v. Asociacion de Empleados, 324 F. Supp, 492, 494, 77 L.R.R.M.
2622, 2624 (D.P.R. 1971),
161
 See, e.g., Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. UMW, 340 F. Supp. 829, 834, 80 L.R.R.M.
2116, 2119-20 (W.D. Pa. 1972), vacated without published opinion, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1973). Furthermore, a union does not waive a completed refusal to bargain by agreeing to the
best contract it can obtain. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 713, 727, 69 L.R.R.M,
2081, 2091 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1968).
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primary dispute, courts have correctly found that the dispute is not
arbitrable. 165
 On the other hand, where the presence of an agree-
ment is only a secondary issue, courts have first decided if a contract
was present and then issued an injunction if the primary dispute
was arbitrable under that contract. 166
3. A Strike Over an Arbitrable Grievance
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court held that a district court
must find that the strike "is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate" before an injunction can be is-
sued.' 67
 That core requirement has provoked serious controversies
involving the standard of arbitrability and the nature of the arbitra-
ble grievance.' 68 Unlike many Boys Markets controversies, these
issues present important theoretical and practical problems.
a. The Standard of Arbitrability. In Gateway, the Supreme
Court sought to define the standard of arbitrability in strike injunc-
tion cases. The Court held that the presumption of arbitrability
enunciated in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co. 169
 should apply in cases in which an injunction against a strike
is sought as well as in cases in which an order to arbitrate is
requested.1 7° The Court, however, reiterated the presumption's
corollary: "[I]n the absence of any express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration . . . only the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can
prevail, particularly where . . . the exclusion clause is vague and the
arbitration clause quite broad."'" In Gateway, the Court found no
express contractual exception' 72
 and held the safety dispute excep-
tion implied by law to be inapplicable.'"
165
 Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Teamsters Local 295, 449 F.2d 586, 591, 78 L.R.R.M.
2466, 2469-70 (2d Cir. 1971); Pullman, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 354 F.
Supp. 496, 499, 82 L.R.R.M. 2638, 2640 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
166 See New York News, Inc. v. Typographers Local 6, 374 F. Supp. 121, 127-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Harmony Dairy Co. v. Teamsters Local 205, 82 L.R.R.M. 2773, 2777
(W.D. Pa. 1972); Amstar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local 9, 345 F. Supp. 331, 336-37, 80
L.R.R.M. 2987, 2989-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
161 398 U.S. at 254.
1 " See, e.g., Comment, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 Yale L.J. 1593,
1602-08 (1970).
169
 363 U.S. 574 (1960):
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage.
Id. at 581-82.
I" Gateway, 414 U.S. at 377-80.
171
 Id. at 380 n.10, quoting Worrier & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85.
112
 414 U.S. at 380 n.10.
173
 Id. at 385-87.
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Gateway resolved a dispute more theoretical than practical.
The Boys Markets decision implied that courts should determine
arbitrability on a case-by-case basis. 14 The Court seemingly re-
quired more than an arguably arbitrable dispute, holding that a
district court must find that "the contract does" require the parties
to arbitrate the disptite. 175 In fact, however, the standard of arbit-
rability applied by the district court in Boys Markets 176 and implicitly
approved by the Supreme Court is not significantly different from
the application of the Warrior & Guff presumption. Thus, even
before Gateway, the presumption was applied in the predominant
majority of arbitrability cases; district courts found disputes arbitra-
ble in 75 percent of the reported decisions." 7
The significance of the use of a presumption of arbitrability is
apparent, for, as a comparison of the two major pre-Gateway stan-
dards reveals, the choice of a standard may determine whether an
injunction issues. In one case, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Communications Workers,'" the contract between the Communica-
tions Workers and Southwestern Bell contained a seniority clause
and a provision prohibiting strikes over "those employee grievances
which are subject to arbitration," including disputes concerning the
"true intent and meaning of any specific provision or provisions [of
the various agreements] (except as such provision or provisions
174 See 398 U.S. at 253-54.
us
	at 254.
176
 The district court found that the dispute "was of a type and character required by the
terms of the .. contract to be submitted to arbitration . . ." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3074 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
177
 Analysis of the reported decisions reveals a strong consensus on the standard of
arbitrability.
District Court Action
Pre-Gateway
33*
not
arbitrable	 arbitrable
Post-Gateway
6
not
arbitrable	 arbitrable
5 5 b 0 0
8 1 3 0
16 e 0 9 0
0 3 b 0 0
4 0 0 0
8° 2 0 0
1 0 0 0
42 11 12 0
no finding on arbitrability
no reported standard
uncontested
presumption
within express exception
"of type"
harsher standard
past actions
* Includes 2 cases remanded for application of presumption.
b
 Includes 1 case remanded for application of presumption.
Includes 1 case remanded for further analysis.
° Includes 1 case remanded under colorable claim standard.
' 7* 454 F.2d 1333, 78 L.R.R.M. 28.33 (5th Cir. 1971).
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relate, either specifically or by effect, to prospective modifications or
amendments of such agreements)." 179 The union objected to the
company's proposed method of staffing a new facility, alleging that
the plan would adversely affect employee seniority rights. 180 Refus-
ing to enjoin the ensuing strike, the district court found that the
employer's plan was a prospective modification of the contract and
thus not a mandatory subject of arbitration under the contract. 1 e'
The Fifth Circuit held that a trial court's examination of the
contract must be limited to "ascertaining whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract and which is 'arguably arbitrable.' " 182 The court held that
the trial court had improperly decided "the substance of the question
for arbitration," rather than "whether or not the parties have bound
themselves to arbitrate that subject matter."'" The court held that
the issue of whether the employer's proposal was a prospective
modification involved the application of the seniority clause of the
contract and should be decided by the arbitrator and not the
court.'" Thus, the 'grievance was governed by the contract, and
was arbitrable.
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has held that trial
courts may not enjoin a strike where the union presents a "colorable
claim" that the underlying dispute falls within a specific exception to
the arbitration clause and where the union has retained the right to
strike over nonarbitrable disputes.'" Faced with the fact situation
present in Southwestern Bell, the Second Circuit would probably
have affirmed the district court's refusal to issue an injunction, for
the Communications Workers had presented a colorable claim that
179 Id. at 1334-35 n.1, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2834 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971).
180 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 324 F. Supp. 830, 832, 76
L.R.R.M. 3032, 3033 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
181 Id. at 832, 834, 76 L.R.R.M. at 3033-34, 3036.
182 454 F.2d at 1336, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2835 (the language after by the contract . ," is
omitted in the L.R.R.M. report). The Third Circuit has adopted a similar standard in
applying a strong presumption in favor of arbitrability. Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459
F.2d 968, 973, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290, 2293 (3d Cir. 1972); see Parade Publications, Inc. v.
Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369, 374, 80 L.R.R.M. 2264, 2267 (3d Cir. 1972).
153 454 F.2d at 1336, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2835. The trial court characterized the company's
proposal as "a prospective modification" of the contract. 324 F. Supp. at 832, 834, 76
L.R.R.M. at 3033-34, 3036. Perhaps it should have merely characterized the dispute as one
involving allegations of a prospective modification, In either case, the dispute would have
fallen within the exception to the arbitration clause and the court would not have invaded the
province of the arbitrator by refusing to enjoin the strike. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit
may have interpreted the exclusion to cover only alleged violations of contractual provisions
dealing with modification of the contract, rather than alleged modifications of any provision of
the contract. Even so, a unilateral change would violate those provisions. See 454 F.2d at
1334-35 n.1, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2834 n.l.
I" 454 F.2d at 1337, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2835.
188 Standard Food Prods. Corp. v. Brandenburg, 436 F.2d 964, 966, 76 L.R.R.M. 2367,
2368 (2d Cir.), rev'g 76 L.R.R.M. 2366, 2367 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See also note 177 supra.
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the company had unilaterally changed the contract. 186 The "color-
able claim" approach is not inconsistent with the corollary to the
presumption of arbitrability: where an express exclusionary clause
exists, a union presumably need not, even under Warrior & Gulf,
introduce "forceful evidence" that a dispute falls within the excep-
tion.'" The Second Circuit's approach has merit where the dispute
involved has allegedly been specifically excluded from the no-strike
and arbitration obligations. In such cases, the parties have ex-
pressed their willingness to resolve specified disputes by economic
force. It is unsatisfactory if extended to contracts containing broad
exceptions to the arbitration/no-strike system)"
The Supreme Court in Gateway never expressly considered the
wisdom of adopting the presumption of arbitrability standard
applicable in Lincoln Mills situations where specific performance of
an arbitration clause is sought)" The premise of cases applying the
presumption of arbitrability is that effectuation of the national labor
policy favoring arbitration requires "that a uniform standard of
arbitrability be applied, regardless of whether the suit asks for the
injunction of a strike . . or the specific performance of an arbitra-
tion clause.. . ." 1 " In their haste for uniform treatment of strike
injunction and specific performance suits, however, the courts have
failed to preserve a careful balance between the two important
national labor policies accommodated in Boys Markets; arbitration
is the favored method of dispute resolution, but courts must not
freely enjoin labor strikes.
Accommodation of these two historic principles requires a more
careful treatment of the arbitrability question than routine applica-
tion of the presumption of arbitrability. Several considerations
mandate this conclusion. First, the Norris-LaGuardia Act permits
federal courts to issue injunctions only against "unlawful" acts,'"
and eliminates court jurisdiction to enjoin strikes. 192 Boys Markets
195
	 fact, the arbitrator later found that the dispute was arbitrable and that the
company's plan would violate the agreement. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 212 N.L.R.B.
No. 53, 86 L.R.R.M. 1655, 1655-56 (1974).
197
 See 363 U.S. at 584-85. See also text at note 170 supra.
186 See notes 135-138 supra and accompanying text. See also Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S.
at 585. In 18.5% of 1961-62 contracts, the parties agreed that the no-strike clause would not
apply when the employer commits specified contract violations. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 1425-6, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements; Arbitra-
tion Procedures 86, 88 (1966). In . 20.2% of 1961-62 contracts, the arbitration clause excluded
one or more specific types of disputes. Id. at 10. See also Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 579 n.5.
199 In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Court held that district
courts had jurisdiction to compel a recalcitrant employer to arbitrate disputes as required by
contract. Id. at 456, 458-59.
19° Southwestern Bell, 454 F.2d at 1336, 78 L,R.R.M. at 2835; accord, Avco Corp. v.
Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290, 2293 (3d Cir. 1972).
191
 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970).
192
 Id. § 104(a).
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accommodated this anti-injunction policy with the equally strong
pro-arbitration policy, holding that a strike over an arbitrable dis-
pute may be enjoined.' 93 Nevertheless, the Court required a finding
that "breaches are occurring. ”194 Application of the presumption of
arbitrability therefore creates two distinct classes of enjoinable acts.
Under section 7 of the Act the burden is on the employer to prove
that the union's activities are "unlawful" and hence enjoinable. 195
But courts applying the presumption of arbitrability assume that the
activity is enjoinable where the employer alleges only a peaceful
strike in breach of contract. Application of the presumption of
arbitrability makes it easier to enjoin arguably protected peaceful
picketing than to enjoin unprotected violence. As a result, the
policies underlying Norris-LaGuardia may lose more vitality than
the "narrow" Boys Markets decision contemplated.
Second, the significant differences between Boys Markets and
Lincoln Mills situations justifies the application of a different pre-
sumption in each type of case. Application of the presumption
assures that courts will order arbitration of some disputes which the
arbitrator will later find not arbitrable.' 96 If this happens in a
Lincoln Mills situation, the parties may then resort to economic
warfare, litigation or negotiation. In a Collyer situation, in which an
unfair labor practice charge brought before the Board is stayed
pending arbitration,'" the parties return to the Labor Board. But in
a Boys Markets situation, the union is permanently harmed, for it is
well recognized that an aborted strike is rarely revived. 198 Thus,
resort to a legitimate form of redress, the strike, may be perma-
nently denied, Accommodation of the two national labor policies
inherent in Boys Markets cases does not require so harsh a result.
Third, Lucas Flour, which set out the circumstances in which
an obligation not to strike could be implied from the presence of an
arbitration clause, 199 and not Lincoln Mills, is the proper starting
point for determining the presence of the arbitrable dispute required
by Boys Markets. A Boys Markets suit is not merely the converse of
Lincoln Mills—an employer rather than union suit to compel
193 398 U.S. at 254.
'" Id. (emphasis added).
195 29 U.S.C.	 107(a) (1970),
196 See Note, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 636, 640-41 (1972).
' 97 In Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1970), the NLRB
announced its policy of deferring to the arbitration process where the resolution of an
arbitrable dispute might also resolve a pending unfair labor practice charge. Id. at 842, 77
L.R.R.M. at 1936.
'" F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor Injunction, 79-80, 200 (1930); 75 Cong. Rec.
4929 (remarks of Sen. Norris), 4934 (remarks of Sen. Bratton) (1932). See also Aaron, Labor
Injunctions in the State Courts—Part II; A Critique, 50 Va. L. Rev. 1147, 1157-58 (1964).
199 369 U.S. at 105-06.
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arbitration—for the suit also seeks to enjoin a strike. Nor does it
merely involve a remedy for the breach of a contractual no-strike
obligation, since the underlying dispute must also fall within the
arbitration clause. 200 Lucas Flour, on the other hand, approximates
the Boys Markets requirements; under Lucas Flour, the court may
not imply a no-strike clause without first determining whether the
underlying grievance is arbitrable."' In applying this principle,
courts cannot presume arbitrability; the court must determine
whether a particular grievance actually is arbitrable. If uniformity is
required, courts should follow Lucas Flour rather than Warrior &
Gulf.
The formulation and application of the proper standard of
arbitrability, like any evidentiary standard, is necessarily imprecise.
However, courts need more flexibility than the presumption of ar-
bitrability allows in order to protect the labor policy inherent in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Rigorous judicial scrutiny of arbitrability
would preclude the issuance of injunctions where the dispute is
actually not arbitrable. The court should enjoin a strike where the
union presents only a perfunctory or frivolous argument that the
dispute is not arbitrable. But where the union presents a colorable
claim that a dispute is not arbitrable, the court should exercise its
authority to determine "substantive arbitrability," 204
 conditioning
the issuance of an injunction on its resolution of that threshold issue.
To preclude union procrastination, the court could issue an injunc-
tion to take effect within two or three days unless the parties had
begun to litigate the arbitrability of the dispute. Because the is-
suance of an injunction is discretionary, a district court could im-
pose this additional step in borderline cases without violating the
rules established in either Boys Markets or Gateway.
b. Nature of the Underlying Grievance. Where the underly-
ing grievance involves an alleged employer breach of contract, the
court need only determine what grievance precipitated the strike 2"
200 398 U.S. at 254.
20 ' 369 U.S. at 106; cf. NLRB v. Deaton Truck Line, Inc., 389 F.2d 163, 169, 67
L.R.R.M. 2632, 2636 (5th Cir. 1968).
2 °2 See 369 U.S. at 106; cf. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 351, 43
L.R.R.M. 2237, 2240 (6th Cir. 1958), aff 'd by an evenly divided Court, 361 U.S. 459 (1960)
(the issue of arbitrability was submitted to a jury in a pre-Lucas Flour case in which a
no-strike dause was implied); San Juan Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1154, 60 L.R.R.M.
1102 (1965), enforced per curiam, 367 F.2d 397, 63 L.R.R.M. 2416 (9th Cir. 1966) (the Board
analyzed the contract and determined that the dispute was not arbitrable and that a strike
over it hence was protected concerted activity).
203 But see Comment, The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions, 79 Yale L.J. 1593,
1602-03 (1970), urging courts to adopt the Warrior & Gulf presumption of arbitrability.
204 See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 558 (1964); Warrior Gulf', 363
U.S. at 582, 583 n.7,
205 The court must reject union attempts to mask its true grievance through assertion of
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and apply the standard of arbitrability. In the more complex cases,
however, courts must also consider the nature of the underlying
grievance, and, in the most complex cases, the identity of the
grievant. As might be expected, courts have not agreed on the
treatment of the complex cases. The resolution of the dispute over
the identification of certain grievances will determine the remaining
vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Although the controversy is
manifest in several areas, the picket line cases are most illustrative.
(1) Refusal to cross a picket line. The courts have divided in
their treatment of requests to enjoin refusals to cross a picket line,
or, as they are more popularly known, "sympathy strikes." The
Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits permit the issuance of an injunc-
tion. 2°6 The Seventh Circuit initially permitted such injunctions, 207
but has subsequently appeared to limit that decision to situations in
which the arbitration clause is "exceptionally broad." 208 The Fifth
Circuit initially held that no injunction may issue, 209 but there are
indications that the court is reconsidering its position. 21 ° The Sec-
spurious, nonarbitrable issues, See, e.g., Restaurant Associates Indus. Inc. v. Commissary.
Food Employees Local 71, 78 L.R.R.M. 2559, 2560-61 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Hilton Int'l Co.
v. Asociacion de Empleados, 324 F. Supp. 492, 494, 77 L.R.R.M. 2622, 2623 (D.P.R. 1971).
205
 Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 89 L.R R.M. 3073
(8th Cir. 1975), Associated Gen. Contractors v. Local 563, Laborers, 519 F.2d 269, 89
L.R.R.M. 3077 (8th Cir. 1975). NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d
321, 324, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974);
Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391, 497
F.2d 312, 313, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974);
Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84 L.R.R.M. 2481,
2484 (4th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari as recently as the October Term, 1975 in three
cases which upheld issuance of an injunction in the sympathy strike situation. Philadelphia
Food Drivers v. Fox Transport Sys., 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 44 tJ.S.L.W. 3192
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1975); Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 44
U.S.L.W. 3192 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3192 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975). At the same time, the Court has
granted certiorari in a case which would not permit an injunction in these circumstances.
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975). It would therefore appear that the Court will reverse the
Second Circuit's decision and accept the reasoning of the Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits.
207 Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 298-99, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733,
2737 (7th Cir. 1974).
2" See Hyster Co. v. Independent Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89, 90-91 n.3, 89 L.R.R.M.
2885, 2886-87 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975); cf. Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284,
288-89, 88 L.R R.M. 2830, 2832-33 (7th Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion).
209
 Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373, 81 L.R.R.M.
2644, 2645 (5th Cir. 1972).
210
 In a recent case, a Florida District Court refused to issue an injunction, relying on
Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir.
1972). Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co, v, National Conf. of Brewery Workers, Civ. No. 75-319-T-H
(M.D. Fla. filed May 15, 197%1. The next evening, Judge Ainsworth granted an injunction
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ond2 " and Sixth Circuits 212 have also prohibited such injunctions.
The issue is now in flux but it appears that the Supreme Court will
adopt the view of the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.
Two assumptions govern the position of the Third, Fourth and
Eighth Circuits. It assumes, first, that the scope of the no-strike
clause is an arbitrable issue. Second, and more significantly, it
assumes that a union must arbitrate whether the no-strike clause
permits employees to respect a given picket line before relying upon
its own interpretation of the clause. Neither assumption is wholly
true, nor necessary to promote the national labor policy favoring
arbitration.
The arbitrability of the scope of the no-strike clause should
depend entirely upon the wording of a particular contract. Where a
contract contains a broad arbitration clause and permits the
employer to file grievances, the existence of a strike in breach of
contract and the assessment of damages for that strike may be arbi-
trable issues. 213 A strike alone, however, does not create an arbi-
trable issue unless the employer may file grievances. Most courts have
refused to consider the effect of "employee-oriented" clauses. 214
One court employed spectacularly circular reasoning to find an
arbitrable grievance, emphasizing that although the employer can-
not grieve, it can trigger the grievance system by disciplining an
employee for refusing to cross a picket line. 215 To protest the disci-
pline, the union must argue that the employee's protected activity is
not cause for discipline. 216 That claim would in turn force the
arbitrator to consider the scope of the no-strike clause. 217 Thus, the
pending appeal. Civ. No. 75-319-T-H (5th Cir. filed May 16, 1975). But see United States
Steel Corp. v. UMW, — F.2d —, 90 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2544 n.15 (5th Cir. 1975).
211 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211, 89 L.R.R.M. 2303,
2305, 2306 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975).
212 Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Typographers Local 53, — F.2d —, 90 L.R.R.M.
2110 (6th Cir. 1975), affirming per curiam, 88 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2160 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
212 Compare Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 256-60
(1962), with Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1962). While an
"employee-oriented" grievance system should be considered mandatory for the purposes of
that Boys Markets requirement, see notes 146-52 supra and accompanying text, it does
preclude the arhitrition of employer claims that the union has breached its no-strike obliga-
tion. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 243; Western Publishing Co. v. Graphic Arts Workers Local 254,
381 F, Supp. 445, 446, 87 L.R.R.M. 2541, 2542 (E.D. Wisc. 1974); Stroehmann Bros. v.
Confectionery Workers Local 427, 215 F. Supp. 647, 650-51, 74 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2959-60
(M.D. Pa. 1970).
214 See, e.g., Monongahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1214, 84
L.R.R.M. 2481, 2484 (4th Cir. 1973).
215 Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. UMW, 375 F. Supp. 980, 983, 86 L.R.R.M. 2398, 2400
(W.D. Pa, 1974).
216 Id,
217 Id. at 983, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2401.
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court concluded that the scope of the no-strike clause is an arbitra-
ble issue. 218 Under this reasoning, the scope of a no-strike clause
would always be arbitrable.
The view of the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits also holds
that an injunction may issue whether or not a contract contains a
provision reserving the right to respect a picket line, 219 In Monon-
gahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, IBEW, 22° the Fourth Circuit held
that an arbitrator must determine "whether the refusal to cross the
picket line and the resulting work stoppage" violated the agree-
ment, 22 ' While a broad provision reserving the right to respect all
picket lines might prevent the issuance of an injunction against a
"sympathy strike, "222 none of the clauses litigated thus far have
been broad reservations. Instead, they have protected refusals to
cross "bona fide," "primary," or "authorized" picket lines. 223 In
NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 224 the Third Cir-
cuit held that the arbitrator must determine whether each particular
picket line falls within the reservation. 225 One court noted that
unions could negotiate contracts expressly removing this issue from
the scope of the arbitration provision if they wished to absolutely
protect their right to respect picket lines. 226 NAPA has been sharply
criticized for misinterpreting the intent of the reservation clause. 227
218 Id .
219
 See, e.g., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 323-24, 87
L.R.R.M. 2044, 2045-46 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
220
 484 F.2d 1209, 84 L.R.RM. 2481 (4th Cir. 1973).
121
 Id. at 1204, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2484; accord, Barnard College v. Transport Workers
Union, 372 F. Supp. 211, 212-13, 85 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2393-94 (S,D.N.Y. 1974); Southwestern
Coal Corp. v. Local 1392, UMW, 70 CCH Lab. Cas. ¶ 13531 at 26721, 26723 (E.D. III.
1972), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. McGuire Shaft & Tunnel Corp. v. Local 1791, UMW,
475 F.2d 1209, 1215 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 958 (1973); Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 815-16, 79 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2427-28
(E.D. La.), rev'd 468 F.2d 1372, 1373, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644, 2645 (5th Cir. 1972).
221
 See NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 323, 87
L.R.R.M. 2044, 2045 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
223
 Id. at 322-24, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2044-46 (primary); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters
Local 391, 497 F.2d 311, 312, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2338 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974) (primary); Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.RM. 2846,
2847 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (bona fide); Food Fair Stories, Inc. v. Food
Drivers Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1254, 1255, 84 L.R.R.M. 2509, 2510 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(bona fide authorized).
224
 502 F.2d 321, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049
(1974).
225
 Id. at 323-24, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2045-46; accord, Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters
Local 391, 497 F.2d 311, 313, 86 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869
(1974); Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); cf. Western Publishing Co. v. Graphic Arts Workers
Local 254, 381 F. Supp. 445, 446, 87 L.R.R.M. 2541 (E.D. Wisc. 1974) (dictum).
226
 Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391, 375 F. Supp. 1254, 1264
(M.D.N.C.), vacated in part on other grounds, 497 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974).
227 NAPA, 502 F.2d at 331 n.14, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2052 n.14 (dissenting opinion).
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The NAPA
-Monongahela holdings that the scope of a "sym-
pathy strike" reservation is an arbitrable issue cannot be accommo-
dated with two significant principles of national labor policy. First,
a waiver of the right must be clear and unmistakable. 228 The Labor
Board has held that a broad no-strike clause does not waive the
right to respect a picket line, but that a limited reservation of the
right to honor such a line may waive that right under circumstances
in which the right has not been reserved. 229 Monongahela conflicts
with that principle by implying the waiver of a statutory right. 23 °
On the other hand, NAPA is consistent, holding that an arbitrator
must determine whether an express waiver applies to a particular
situation. 231 Second, courts must require all grievances covered by
the contract to be arbitrated, even if they feel that the grievance is
frivolous, under the rule in United Steelworkers v. American Man-
ufacturing Co. 232 The cumulative effect of NAPA and United Steel-
workers is to allow an employer to frustrate a limited reservation by
alleging, however frivolously, that a particular picket line is secon-
dary, unauthorized or established in bad faith. That claim alone
requires courts to order arbitration and enjoin activity which in fact
may be protected under the contract and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.
The most severe impact of the NAPA -Monongahela position
results from its second major assumption—that a union may not rely
upon its interpretation of the scope of the no-strike clause or reser-
vation provision, but must await the arbitrator's approval before
advising members to respect a specific picket line. That assumption
is inconsistent with Boys Markets and with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and is not necessary to promote the national policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes.
In Boys Markets, the Court held that before granting an injunc-
tion, the district court must find that "breaches are occurring . . . or
228 E.g., NLRB v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., 440 F.2d 393, 399, 76 L.R.R.M,
2576, 2581 (7th Cir. 1971); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v, NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 751, 54
L.R.R.M. 2785, 2789 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1963); see Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956).
229 Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1214-15
(1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284, 289, 88 L.R.R.M. 2030, 2033 (7th Cir. 1975). The Board
reasoned that the right to strike, fundamental under the National Labor Relations Act, see 29
U.S,C, 157 (1970), includes the right to respect a picket line. That right may be waived, in
whole or in part, only by clear and unmistakeable language. 86 L.R.R.M. at 1213. Extrinsic
evidence concerning the scope of the waiver may be considered only where the express waiver
is ambiguous. Id. at 1215. A broad no-strike clause does not specifically waive the right to
respect a picket line. An employer must obtain an express'waiver but the union need not
obtain an express reservation. Id. at 1214.
23° Manongahela, 484 F.2d at 1213-14, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2484.
231 502 F.2d at 323-24, 87 L.R.R.M. at 245-46.
232 363 U.S, 564, 568-69 (1960).
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. . . will be committed" and that the strike is "over" an arbitrable
grievance. 233 Similarly, Norris-LaGuardia requires a finding that
"unlawful acts" have been or will be committed. 234 Thus, before a
court may enjoin a strike, it must find that the strike itself is a
breach of contract. A determination that the grievance which pre-
cipitated the dispute was arbitrable means that the union has
breached its no-strike obligation by striking rather than resorting to
the grievance-arbitration mechanism, even if it wins the eventual
arbitration of the underlying grievance. In the NAPA -Monongahela
line of cases, the Boys Markets principle was extended to permit
courts to restrain unions from encouraging their members to respect
a picket line. 235 There, however, the only arbitrable issue is whether
the union's actions violated the no-strike provisions. If the union
wins the eventual arbitration, the award essentially establishes that
there never was a breach of contract. Neither Boys Markets nor the
Norris-LaGuardia Act contemplated restraint of arguably legal
strike activity.
More importantly, that view effectively eliminates the Boys
Markets requirements that there be "binding arbitration of the griev-
ance dispute concerning which the strike was called" and that the
strike be "over" an arbitrable dispute. 236 As these requirements
emphasize, Boys Markets merely was intended to provide a
mechanism for enforcing a union's agreement to arbitrate certain
grievances. The decision was not intended to provide a broad
mechanism for enforcing a union's agreement not to strike. it logi-
cally follows that a court should not enjoin action taken to support a
sister union since the sympathetic union has no underlying grievance
against its employer and merely supports another union, whose
dispute may or may not be arbitrable under another agreement.
Unlike most strike activity covered by Boys Markets, a sympathy
strike is not designed to circumvent the grievance system. As the
Fifth Circuit held in Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 237
a sympathy strike is "not 'over a grievance' which the parties were
contractually bound to arbitrate. Rather, the strike itself precipi-
233 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added).
234 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970).
233
 In Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391, 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M.
2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), the Fourth Circuit held that even though a
district court could not enjoin individual employees from refusing to cross a picket line
because the contract clearly reserved the right to engage in sympathy strikes, it could enjoin
the Union from encouraging its members to respect the picket line pending arbitration of
whether the Union was also protected by the reservation. Id. at 312, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2338-39.
236 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 238, 254; Cf. Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 /sI.L.R.B.
No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213-14 (1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284, 289, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830,
2833 (7th Cir. 1975).
237
 468 F.2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644 (5th Cir. 1972).
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fated the dispute-the validity under the Union's no-strike obliga-
tion of the member-employees honoring the . . . picket line." 238 The
Second and Fifth Circuit position thus is consistent with the "nar-
row" holding of Boys Markets.
The view expounded by the Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits
significantly expands the Boys Markets decision. Monongahela
found that the union had an affirmative obligation to terminate
unauthorized strikes which, in the opinion of the court, constituted
breaches of the obligation to arbitrate rather than strike. 239 Other
courts, following Monongahela, have held that the refusal to cross a
picket line is a strike "over" an arbitrable grievance.'" In NAPA,
the Third Circuit failed even to consider whether the underlying
grievance was arbitrable. 24 ' Indeed, NAPA represents the aban-
donment of the Third Circuit's previous position that Boys Markets
does not support the issuance of an injunction when the only arbitra-
ble issue advanced by the employer is whether the no-strike clause
has been breached. 242
Elimination of the distinction between the union's underlying
grievance and the employer's dispute caused by the strike trans-
forms Boys Markets from a pro-arbitration mechanism into an anti-
strike procedure. Without that distinction, a court could enjoin a
strike whenever the resolution of an arbitrable issue might end the
strike. 243 Whenever the employer could allege that the strike was a
breach of contract for any reason, the court could issue an injunc-
tion and order arbitration, since the arbitrator might sustain the
employer's position. Yet, resolution of the employer's grievance
would not eliminate the basis of the employees' dissatisfaction: the
238
 Id. at 1373, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2644; accord, Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local 560, 373 F. Supp. 19, 24, 86 L.R.R.M, 2324, 2327-28 (D.N.J. 1974) (permanent
injunction); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters Local 560, 86 L.R.R.M. 2322, 2322-23
(D.N.J. 1974) (temporary restraining order); General Cable Corp. v. Local 1644, IBEW, 331
F. Supp. 478, 482, 77 L,R.R.M. 3053, 3055-56 (D. Md. 1971).
239
 484 F.2d at 1213-14, 84 L. R.R.M. at 2484.
240 See, e. g Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M.
2845, 2846 (E.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1022 (1974).
241
 502 F.2d at 324 n.1, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2046 n.1 (dissenting opinion). See also Barnard
College v, Transport Workers Union, 372 F. Supp. 211, 212-13, 85 L.R.R.M. 2393-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Southwestern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Local 1392, UMW, 70 CCH Lab. Cas.
¶ 13531 at 26721, 26723 (E.D, Ill. 1972), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. McGuire Shaft &
Tunnel Corp. v. Local 1791, UMW, 475 F.2d 1209, 1215 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 958 (1973).
242
 Parade Publications, Inc. v. Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369, 374, 80 L.R.R.M. 2264,
2267 (3d Cir. 1974).
241 See, e.g., NAPA, 502 F.2d at 330, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2051 (dissenting opinion).
Carnation Co. v. Teamsters Local 949, 86 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3013-14 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644, 2645 (3d Cir.
1972).
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employer's treatment of fellow unionists. Moreover, sympathy
strikes do not frustrate the arbitration process. Sympathetic action
may affect the resolution of the primary grievance by increasing the
primary union's economic leverage. But if the primary grievance is
arbitrable, a limited Boys Markets injunction will end the primary
strike, and with it all sympathetic action. On the other hand, if the
primary grievance is not arbitrable, the primary union is free to use
economic coercion under Boys Markets. When the employer can
eliminate sympathetic pressure by merely alleging that the use of
such pressure violates the sympathetic union's contractual obliga-
tions and is causing irreparable injury, the courts are intervening in
legitimate primary economic warfare. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the National Labor Relations Act were designed to preclude
just such judicial interference. 244
(2) Wildcat strikes. Unions have argued that strikes not au-
thorized by the union itself are outside the scope of section 301 and
that, therefore, no injunction may issue. 245 Section 301, however,
expands the common law definition of agency by eliminating prior
authorization or subsequent ratification as prerequisites for a union's
responsibility for contractual violations by its agents. 246 Thus, the
relevant question is whether the union "adopted, encouraged or
prolonged" the strike, not whether the union did its best to end the
strike. 247 Courts have rejected union arguments that unauthorized
strikes have occurred which are not contractual breaches under
section 301, on both legal and evidentiary grounds. Often they have
scrutinized the record for subtle evidence that the union has im-
plicitly sanctioned the strike 248 or inferred union authorization from
its failure to exert substantial pressure to curtail the strike. 249 The
244
 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf. of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324, 1328,
89 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2558 (7th Cir. 1972); Meekins, Inc. v. Boire, 320 F.2d 445, 450, 53
L.RRM. 2732, 2735-36 (5th Cir. 1963).
245
 See, e.g., General Cable Corp. v. Local 1798, IBEW, 333 F. Supp. 331, 331-32, 77
L.RR.M. 3123, 3124 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); General Cable Corp. v. Local 1644, IBEW, 331 F.
Supp. 478, 481, 77 L.R.R M. 3053, 3055 (D. Md. 1971).
246 29 U.S.C. 1) 185(e) (1970).
247
 United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877-78, 36 L.R.R.M.
2315, 2318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955). See also Garmeada Coal Co. v.
UMW, 230 F.24 945 (6th Cir. 1956); Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp.
626, 628-29, 27 L.R.R.M. 2164, 2166-67 (M.D.N.C. 1950).
248
 See Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. 810, 815, 79
L.R.R.M. 2425, 2428 (E.D. La.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F,2d 1372, 81 L.R.R.M. 2644
(5th Cir. 1972) (only 3.5% of employees worked; no union officers worked); General Cable
Corp. v. Local 1798, IBEW, 333 F. Supp. 331, 332-33, 77 L.R.R.M. 3123, 3124-25 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971) (while union officers advised employees to return to work, no officer or member
of the union returned); General Cable Corp. v. Local 1644, IBEW, 331 F. Supp. 478, 480-81,
77 L.R.R.M. 3053, 3054-55 (D. Md. 1971) (while union officers admitted obligation to work,
they encouraged employees to refuse to cross picket line, and refused to cross themselves).
249 See, e.g., Monongahela, 484 F.2d at 1214-15, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2485; United States
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Eighth Circuit directed a district court to issue an injunction requir-
ing the union to order its members back to work, even though twice
noting that the union was wholly uninvolved in calling the strike. 25°
Despite a finding that wildcat strikers cannot be held financially
liable under section 301 for the breach of a no-strike clause, the
Seventh Circuit refused to decide whether wildcat strikers might be
enjoined under Boys Markets. 251
Courts issuing injunctions against wildcat strikers misconstrue
the nature of the collective bargaining agreement and the thrust of
the Boys Markets decision. Three conceptions of the labor agree-
ment might support the issuance of an injunction against an unau-
thorized strike. Under those views, a labor agreement is either: (1) a
contract of employment executed by a union as agent for its mem-
bers; (2) an offer by the employer incorporated in individual
employment contracts; or (3) a third-party beneficiary agreement
between the union and the employer enforceable by and against the
employee beneficiaries. 252
 Those conceptions are inconsistent with
the prevalent view that the collective bargaining agreement repre-
sents a set of "working rules" 253
 applicable only after the employer
and individual employees execute an employment contract. 254 Thus,
as one commentator has argued, "[tjhe usual no-strike provision .. .
is a promissory one, but the promise is the union's, not the
employee's. As to employees, the provision is a rule of conduct for
violation of which the expected consequence, as with any other rule
governing employee conduct, is the possible imposition of disci-
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 77 L.R.R.M. 3134, 3134-35 (E.D. Ky. 1971); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v.
Teamsters Local 327, 76 L.R.R.M. 2379 (M.D. Tenn. 1971). See also Eazor Express, Inc. v.
Teamsters, — F.2d—, 89 L.R.R.M. 3177 (3d Cir. 1975). But see North Am. Coal Corp. v.
Local 2262, UMW, 497 F.2d 459, 465-66, 86 L.R.R.M. 2339, 2343-44 (6th Cir. 1974) (no
criminal contempt liability of union officials for continuation of enjoined strike without actual
proof of authorization or encouragement).
25° Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565, 567, 569 n.4, 80 L.R.R.M.
3268, 3269, 3270 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
25' Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 452 F.2d 49, 54 n.10, 78 L.R.R.M. 2603,
2606 n.10 (7th Cir. 1971).
252
 Cf. Association of Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623,
626, 33 L.R.R.M. 2462, 2464 (3d Cir. 1954) (en banc), off 'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 437,
459-61 (1955). In Westinghouse, all three conceptions were advanced by the union as grounds
for federal court jurisdiction over a suit for past wages allegedly due union members. Id. at
625, 33 L.R.R.M, at 2624. The Third Circuit rejected all three and held that it had no
jurisdiction under § 301, since only the rights of the individual employee and not those of the
union were involved. Id. at 630, 33 L.R.R.M. at 2467-68.
253
 See United Steelworkers v, Warrior & Gulf Nav, Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), in which
the Court viewed the collective agreement as codifying "the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant." Id. at 578-80.
254
 Association of Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623, 627,
33 L.R.R.M. 2462, 2465-66. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944).
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pline." 255
 Under that view, suits seeking injunctive relief against
wildcat strikers are outside the scope of section 301. 256
Strikes over internal union disputes require a careful balancing
of competing legitimate interests. On the one hand, the employer
has executed a contract in good faith and can legitimately expect
compliance with its no-strike clause. On the other hand, employees
should remain free to challenge the legitimacy of their representa-
tive's actions. The problem is most acute where a local union
questions the desirability of contract provisions negotiated by the
national union. In one such case, a strike over a dispute between
"union locals and the higher echelons of the union hierarchy" was
held to be not arbitrable, and thus beyond the reach of a Boys
Markets injunction. 257
 Shortly thereafter, another judge on the same
court enjoined a strike partially caused by employee dissatisfaction
with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, ruling that
employees were bound by the agreement negotiated by the national
union and that employee dissatisfaction with their bargaining agent
could not be expressed by a strike against the employer. 258 The
latter court justified its decision by noting that the union and the
employer had submitted the contractual issue which precipitated the
strike to arbitration under the expired contract, and that the
employer had prevailed. 259. Nevertheless, by finding that dissatisfac-
tion with the union may have caused the strike, the court refuted its
own argument that the injunction was necessary to enforce the
arbitration system, since internal union disputes clearly could not be
arbitrable. While the sanctity of the labor agreement and of a stable
bargaining relationship might merit enforcement, the Supreme
Court emphasized in Gateway that the - "linchpin" of Boys Markets
255
 Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 Calif. L. Rev.
663, 777 (1973).
256
 Of course, this would not affect the employer's right to enforce in a damage action a
union's express contractual agreement to use its best efforts to terminate a wildcat strike.
Compare Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 357 F. Supp. 158, 163-67, 169, 82
L.R.R.M. 3025, 3028-32, 3033 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, — F.2d —, 89 L.R.R.M. 3177 (3d
Cir. 1975), with Penn Packing Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 195, 497 F.2d 888, 891, 86
L.R.R.M. 2657, 2658 (3d Cir. 1974).
Some courts have also allowed the issuance of an injunction requiring the union to meet
its contractual obligation to take steps to end a wildcat strike. Hanna Mining Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565, 569, 80 L.R.R.M. 3268, 3271 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); See
Monongahela, 484 F.2d at 1214-15, 84 L.R.R.M. at 2485. At any rate, any injunction issued
should not require employees to cease striking, but should at most require that union officers
do their best to terminate the strike.
257
 Barnes & Tucker Co. v. UMW, 338 F. Supp. 924, 927, 80 L.R.R.M. 2316, 2319
(W.D. Pa. 1972). 	 •
258
 Bethlehem Mines Corp, v. UMW, 340 F. Supp. 829, 834, 80 L.R.R.M. 2116,
2119-20 (W.D. Pa. 1972), vacated without opinion, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973).
259 Id., 80 L.R.R.M. at 2119.
928
BOYS MARKETS DECISION
was "the strong federal policy favoring arbitration of labor dis-
putes. 51260
Even if section 301 would permit injunctive relief against indi-
vidual employees, Boys Markets imposes substantial restrictions
upon the issuance of any anti-strike injunction. While individual
employees may file a grievance under most labor agreements, the
union assumes full control over the grievance at some stage in the
grievance-arbitration mechanism. 26 ' If employees wildcat because
their union has refused to process a grievance, an injunction order-
ing arbitration may not resolve the underlying grievance. The court
must consider whether the union will fairly represent wildcat strik-
ers in the ensuing grievance-arbitration process. 262 Under similar
circumstances, the Labor Board has refused to defer to the arbitra-
tion process and to the resulting award where the interest of the
employee grievant and the union are not in "substantial har-
mony." 263 Courts should adopt a similar approach in Boys Markets
cases. 264
(3) Health and safety disputes. In Gateway, the Supreme
Court held that the presumption of arbitrability applies to safety
disputes and that strikes over arbitrable safety disputes may be
enjoined. 265
 However, under Gateway, "a work stoppage called
260 414 U.S. at 381-82.
161 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 175 n.3 (1967).
363
 In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court held that an individual
employee may bring suit under section 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), against his employer for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, despite the fact that the employee has not
exhausted his grievance remedies, if the union has wrongfully refused to process his griev-
ance. 386 U.S. at 186. As such, the wildcat striker might still have a remedy against the
employer if he loses in arbitration because of the union's failure to represent him fairly.
263
 Kansas City Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.I3. No. 2, 80 L.R.R.M. 1743, 1746-47 n.5
(1972). See also NLRB v. Auburn Rubber Co., 384 F.2d I, 4, 66 L.R.R.M. 2129, 2131 (10th
Cir. 1967); Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 515, 50 L.R.R.M. 1419, 1421 (1963).
2" The courts may be forced to consider the possibility of employee-union disagreement
sua sponte, since neither the employer nor the union, the normal parties to a Boys Markets
injunction case, are likely to raise that issue voluntarily.
Although accepting the premise that Boys Markets is designed to protect the arbitration
system, one commentator nonetheless argued that only a "wooden application of Boys Mar-
kets" would require the denial of an injunction against a wildcat strike since denying
injunction relief "would substantially undermine the union structure and impair the entire
concept of an orderly administration of the collective bargain." Isaacson, A Fresh Look at the
Labor Injunction, Proceedings of the Southwestern Legal Foundation 17th Annual Institute
on Labor Law 231, 245-46 (1971). A second commentator argued that injunctions against
individual employees were permissible, but relied upon state court decisions enforcing no-
strike clauses. Spelfogel, Wildcat Strikes and Minority Concerted Activity—Discipline, Dam-
age Suits, and Injunctions, Proceedings of the Southwestern Legal Foundation 19th Annual
Institute on Labor Law 157, 192 (1973). The values which these authors emphasize go beyond
the promotion of the grievance-arbitration mechanism which was the limited goal of Boys
Markets.
265
 414 U.S. at 379-80, 387.
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solely to protect employees from immediate danger" is protected by
section 502 266 and may not be enjoined. 267 A union claiming this
legal exception to the Boys Markets doctrine "must present 'ascer-
tainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an ab-
normally dangerous condition for work exists.' "268 The Court also
implied that injunctions could issue against strikes protected under
section 502 if the district court conditions injunctive relief on the
temporary abatement of the allegedly dangerous condition pending
the arbitrator's decision. 269
Those requirements suggest that a district court may not issue
an ex parte order in a safety case. Unless the union has an opportu-
nity to argue the applicability of section 502, its protection will be
meaningless.
(4) Negotiation disputes. Provisions for the arbitration of en-
tire labor agreements are rare, but are apparently becoming more
frequent. 27° Clauses requiring the arbitration of impasses arising
from mid-term reopenings are far more common. 271 Thus, even
after the technical expiration of a contract, a court may enjoin a
strike in derogation of an interest arbitration provision requiring
that the parties arbitrate disputes over the terms of the new con-
tract. 272
 Where, however, the parties have not provided for interest
arbitration, a court should not issue an injunction depriving a union
of "its most important weapon, the right to strike at the table where
266 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970).
267
 414 U.S. at 385; see note 90 supra.
266
 414 U.S. at 387, quoting Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1162, 80
L.R.R.M. 3153, 3156 (3d Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion). For an application of this exception,
see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1154, 89 L.R.R.M. 3118 (3d Cir. 1975).
369
 See 414 U.S. at 387.
270
 See Arbitration of Interest Disputes, Proceedings, 26th Annual Meeting of National
Academy of Arbitrators (1973); Feller, The Impetus to Contract Arbitration, Proceedings, New
York Univ. Twenty-Fourth Annual Conference on Labor 79 (1972); Comment, Voluntary
Arbitration of New Contract Terms—A Forum in Search of a Dispute, 16 Lab. L.J. 765, 768,
776 (1965).
271
 A study of 400 contracts effective in 1971 found that 11 percent contained reopening
provisions with special impasse procedures. "Of these, slightly more than a third provide for
cancellation of the no strike pledges [in the event of an impasse] while a third cancel or
suspend the contract. These percentages correspond closely to those of 1965. Provisions for
arbitration of impasses arising from reopenings, however, are now found in 42 percent,
compared to 25 percent in the preceding study." 2 BNA Collective Bargaining Negotiations
and Contracts 36:3 (1971).
272
 See Favino Mechanical Constr., Ltd. v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 269, 78
L.R.R.M. 2389, 2391, 2392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The NLRB subsequently held that the
employer association representing Favino did not violate §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. $§ 158(a)(1), (5) (1970), by presenting impassed issues to a bipartisan panel, pursuant
to an expiring contract, including the question of whether the panel's authority to settle the
terms of a new contract should be continued under the new agreement. Mechanical Contrac-
tors' Ass'n, 202 N.L.R.B. •1, 3, 82 L.R.R.M. 1438, 1440 (1973). The Board, however, rested
its holding on the characterization of the panel as a second-stage negotiating team and not as a
standard arbitration panel. Id. at 2, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1440.
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a new contract is being discussed . . . • "273 A damage award or
injunctive relief may be appropriate, however, where a union
strikes during mid-term negotiations without an express reservation.
(5) Representationalljurisdictional disputes. Despite the
Supreme Court's endorsement of the "therapy of arbitration" in
representational or jurisdictional disputes, 274 courts have denied
injunctive relief under Boys Markets in such cases to avoid frag-
mented remedies and multiple litigation.'" Thus, where one
employer sought to enjoin a strike in support of a non-incumbent
union, the district court suggested that the employer could initiate
unfair labor practice proceedings, noting that the Labor Board
would seek injunctive relief against the strike.'"
In another suit for injunctive relief against a representational
strike, the Second Circuit indicated that it would deny relief because
the dispute could be characterized as a jurisdictional controversy
specifically excluded from arbitration by the contract,'" suggesting
that the employer could resolve the dispute by filing a request for a
unit clarification to the Labor Board."'" Furthermore, the court
noted, the Labor Board may seek temporary injunctive relief
373 Herald Co. v. Hopkins, 325 F. Supp. 1232, 1234-35, 77 L.R.R.M. 2199, 2201
(N.D.N.Y. 1971). Nevertheless, a union may not strike in support of its bargaining demands
until either the expiration date of its contract, or until 60 days after informing the employer of
its desire to terminate or modify the contract, whichever occurs later. 29 U.S.C. §* 158(b)(3),
(d) (1970). See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 285 (1957); Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285-86 (1956). This statutory prohibition should be enforceable only
though a damage action, through employer-imposed discipline, or by the NLRB in an unfair
labor practice proceeding. Although the Board has authority, after issuance of a complaint, to
seek to enjoin such a strike, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970), it rarely chooses to exercise that power.
In the 27 years during which the Board has had such authority, it has sought to enjoin only 15
such strikes. The Board's reluctance to utilize the power granted in Section 10(j) has fre-
quently been criticized. See, e.g., Comment, The Role of the Temporary Injunction in
Reforming Labor Law Administration, 8 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Prob. 553, 563-74 (1972).
274 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
275 See, e.g., Lanco Coal Co. v, Local 2S0, SLU, 320 F. Supp. 273, 275, 76 L.R.R.M.
2249, 2251 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
276 Id. Where the Board has reasonable cause to believe that an uncertified union has
unlawfully picketed to secure recognition, the Board must seek to enjoin the picketing. 29
U.S.C. § 160(1), 158(b)(7) (1970). A strike to defeat a unit certified by the NLRB may also
violate § 8(b)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(3), even if an arbitrator has upheld the
union's requested unit, and the Board seeks to enjoin the strike. See Sperry Sys. Management
Div. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 63, 67-69, 85 L.R.R M. 2521, 2523-25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 831 (1974); Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 102 n.5, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2714 n.5
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
The impact of the Board's Collyer doctrine, see note 196 supra, on that possibility is
unclear. See Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1, 84 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1973).
277 Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 103, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2714 (2d Cir. 1971)
(dictum), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
2 " See id. at 102 n.5, 78 L.R.R,M. at 2714 n.5; 29 U.S.C. § 159(0(1) (1970). See also
NLRB Rules and Regulations § 102.60(h), 29 CFR § 102.60(b) (1975). The Board has refused
to defer to arbitration in unit issues involving more than one union. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel.
Co., 207 N.L.R,I3. No, 9, 84 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1973).
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against such jurisdictional strikes. 279 The court failed to note, how-
ever, that the Labor Board cannot seek such relief if the parties to a
jurisdictional dispute submit evidence that they have provided for
the voluntary adjustment of the dispute. 28 ° At any rate, no court
should issue an injuction compelling the arbitration of the jurisdic-
tional disputes pursuant to a labor agreement unless all competing
unions and the employer have access to the arbitration process. 2"
(6) Employer unfair labor practice disputes. Courts may even
enjoin'strikes caused by alleged employer unfair labor practices. 282
The Supreme Court held in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB 283 that
a broad no-strike clause does not "waive the employees' right to
strike solely against the unfair labor practices of their employers," 284
absent an express waiver. The Labor Board, however, has inter-
preted Mastro as leaving an unfair labor practice strike over an
arbitrable dispute unprotected unless the unfair labor practice is
" 'destructive of the foundation upon which collective bargaining
must rest,' " and has deferred to arbitration under Collyer Insulated
Wire. 285 Applying the principles adopted by the Board, a court may
enjoin alleged unfair labor practice strikes unless the employer has
committed fundamentally unfair practices which effectively re-
pudiate the contract or withdraw recognition from the certified
union.
279
 Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 102 n.5, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2714 n.5 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(D), 160(k)(1) (1970).
280
 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970).
281
 In NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
"absent private agreement, [employers) must be deemed parties to the adjustment or agree-
ment to settle [jurisdictional disputes] that will abort the § 10(k) proceedings." Id. at 131. The
Labor Board has refused to give deference to an arbitration award whenever parties affected
by the award were not parties in the proceeding. Retail Clerks Local 1100, 203 N.L.R.B. 548,
549 n,2, 83 L.R.R.M. 1145, 1146 n.2 (1973); see Machinists District 10, 200 N.L.R.B. 1159,
1160 n.4, 82 L.R.R.M. 1081, 1081-82 n.4 (1972).
282
 E.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 343 F. Supp. 1165,
1172, 80 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2517-18 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communi-
cations Workers, 324 F. Supp. 830, 833, 76 L.R.R.M. 3032, 3035 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
283 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
284
 Id. at 281, 284.
282
	 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Arlan's Dep't Store Inc., 133 N.L.R.B.
802, 807-08, 48 L.R.R.M. 1731, 1734-35 (1961), quoting Mastro, 350 U.S. at 281. See Jones &
McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97, 104-05, 77 L.R.R.M. 2710-11 (7th Cir. 1971),
enforcing 183 N.L.R.B. 82, 91, 76 L.R.R.M. 1474, 1475 (1970); Atlantic Richfield Co., 199
N.L.R.B. 1224, 1225 n.1, 81 L.R.R.M. 1412, 1414 n.1 (1972); cf. Communications Workers
(Western Elec. Co.), 204 N.L.R.B. 782, 784, 83 L.R.R.M. 1583, 1585 (1973).
In one case the Board indicated that the failure to pay wages when due was the type of
fundamental breach which would provide protection to an unfair labor practice strike under
Mastro. San Juan Lumber Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1155, 60 L.R.R.M. 1102, 1103 (1965)
(dictum), enforced on other grounds per curiam, 367 F.2d 397, 63 L.R.R.M. 2416 (9th Cir.
1966).
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4. Exhaustion of Remedies—"Clean Hands"
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court briefly mentioned that the
employer has prepared to proceed with arbitration when it sought an
injunction against the union's strike activity. 286 Section 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, however, restricts a federal court's equity
powers in labor disputes to situations where the complaining party
has met his legal obligations with respect to the dispute and has
made "every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotia-
tion . . . or voluntary arbitration." 287 The restrictions of section 8
must be applied in Boys Markets cases. 288
Although section 8 seemingly codifies the equitable "clean
hands" doctrine and denies relief to an employer who "has not
complied with any contract or obligation on his part," 289 the cases
interpreting Boys Markets appear instead to treat the section as an
exhaustion of remedies requirement. 29° This is highly appropriate.
Construction of section 8 as a "clean hands" requirement might deny
equitable relief to any employer whose alleged breach of contract
provoked a strike, and would require the court to consider the
merits of the dispute before ordering arbitration. 29 I The functional
vitality of arbitration as the preferred method of alleviating the
causes and consequences of industrial discord requires that
employers be allowed access to the courts to force arbitration regard-
less of whether they have actually breached their contracts. 292
286
 398 U.S. at 254. The district court had found that the employer had demanded that
the dispute be submitted to arbitration and that the union had refused. Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3074 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Under the contract, only
the union could file a grievance and trigger the arbitration mechanism. Id. at 3073-74.
282
 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
288
 See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Drivers Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1254,
1257-58, 84 L.R.R.M. 2509, 2512-13 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
288
 75 Cong. Rec. 5464 (1932) (Remarks of Rep. O'Connor), quoted in Railroad Train-
men Lodge 27 v. Toledo, P. & W.R,R., 321 U.S. 50, 60 (1944). See 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
29° See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 324 F. Supp. 830,
833-34, 76 L.R.R.M. 3022, 3035 (S.D. Tex. 1971), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
454 F.2d 1333, 1335-36, 78 L.R.R.M. 2833, 2885 (5th Cir. 1971).
261
 Cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 454 F,2d 1333, 1335,
78 L.R.R.M. 2833, 2835 (5th Cir, 1971).
292 Judicial treatment of disputes arising under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 151-88 (1970), indicates the importance of retaining employer access. Unless the employer
has precipitated the strike by refusing to arbitrate, courts will enjoin strikes over "minor
disputes." See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v, Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30,
39-40, 42 (1957); Railroad Trainmen Lodge 27 v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 60-65
(1944). "Minor disputes" relate to the "meaning or proper application of a particular [contract]
provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. . [T]lie claim is to
rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future." Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-24 (1945). "Major disputes" involve "the formation of collective
agreements or efforts to secure them." Id.; Brotherhood•of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957).
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Courts have developed three prerequisites to meeting the
exhaustion of remedies requirement. The employer (I) must express
his willingness to arbitrate the dispute; (2) must attempt to utilize
the grievance-arbitration procedure where the contract provides for
employer access; and (3) must not abuse the grievance
mechanism. 293 Judicial application of these criteria has been incon-
sistent.
Courts have issued , injunctions regardless of whether the
employer expressed his willingness to arbitrate at the time that the
dispute arose or at the time of his request for injunctive relief. 294
Unless an employer's timely expression of his willingness to arbitrate
is necessary to demonstrate his good faith, the point at which he
seeks arbitration is irrelevant. If good faith is a necessary element,
the employer should be required to offer to arbitrate when the
dispute arises. On the other hand, if good faith is irrelevant, an
employer's willingness to arbitrate should be presumed once he files
for injunctive relief under Boys Markets. 295 GoOd faith should be
relevant only if the employer has attempted to frustrate the
grievance-arbitration mechanism by rejecting the union's offer to
arbitrate the underlying dispute.
The requirement that any employer with contractual authority
to file a grievance exhausts his grievance remedies before seeking an
injunction 296
 misconstrues the Boys Markets decision. An employ-
er's grievance necessarily involves alleged union misconduct. Nor-
mally, this will be the union's strike in breach of contract in the
Boys Markets situation; yet arbitration of the union's right to strike
will do nothing to settle the dispute which precipitated the strike.
Thus, Boys Markets was intended to vindicate only the union's
promise to utilize the grievance-arbitration process, rather than
economic coercion, to resolve substantive grievances. An employer's
failure to file an available grievance should be irrelevant.
Judicial concern about employer abuse of the arbitration pro-
cess has been inconsistent. The Eighth Circuit enjoined a union strike
Unless the contract contains an interest arbitration clause, any dispute to which Boys
Markets might apply is by definition a "minor dispute."
2 " See, e.g., MacFadden-Bartell Corp. v. Teamsters Local 1034, 1045, 345 F. Supp. 1286,
1289-90, 80 L.R.R.M. 3234, 3237 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Transamerican Trailer Trans., Inc. v.
Seafarers Intl, 336 F. Supp. 1052, 1057, 80 L.R.R.M. 2965, 2969 (D.P.R. 1971); Elevator
Mfgs. Ass'n v. Elevator Constructors Local 1, 331 F. Supp. 165, 167, 78 L.R.R.M. 2215,
2216 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
294 See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 300, 87 L.R.R.M.
2733, 2738 (7th Cir. 1974).
29 Id.
296 See, e.g., Transamerican Trailer Trans., Inc. v. Seafarers Intl, 336 F. Supp. 1052,
1057, 80 L.R.R.M. 2965, 2969 (D.P.R. 1971); Elevator Mfg's. Ass'n v. Elevator Constructors
Local I, 331 F. Supp. 165, 167, 78 L.R.R.M. 2215, 2216 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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despite a finding that the employer had interfered with the grievance
system by (1) immediately suspending employees who protested
unsafe conditions without allowing them to file grievances, (2) refus-
ing to process safety grievances promptly and (3) refusing to attend
conciliation meetings called by the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service. 297 On the other hand, one district court refused to
enjoin peaceful picketing by employees laid off, without notice, in a
change of operations, because their union had submitted the legiti-
macy of the proposed layoff to arbitration, and because the
employer had acted unilaterally rather than submit to arbitration. 298
Since Boys Markets is intended to remedy union abuse of the arbi-
tration system, relief should be denied to any employer who has
abused it. A union faced with an injunction should demand, in open
court, immediate arbitration, waiving all preliminary stages of the
grievance system. If the employer refuses, the court may deny the
injunction because of the employer's bad faith.
5. Equitable Requirements
After considering the underlying dispute and the parties' con-
tract, the court under Boys Markets must further consider the
impact of the strike upon the parties. The court must determine
"whether an injunction would be warranted under ordinary princi-
ples of equity," including "whether [contract violations] have caused
or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the
employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will
the union from its issuance."299 However, the Supreme Court in
Boys Markets minimized the impact of the requirement that equita-
ble considerations tip in the favor of the employer, by finding that:
an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no
substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Fur-
thermore, an action for damages prosecuted during or after
a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial
297
 Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565, 568-69, 80 L.R.R.M.
3268, 3270-71 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). The court did, however, order the reinstatement of
the employees and the temporary abatement of the unsafe conditions which they had pro-
tested, pending arbitration. Id. at 569, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3271.
293
 McFadden-Bartell Corp. v. Teamsters Local 1034, 345 F. Supp. 1286, 1289-90, 80
L.R.R.M. 3234, 3237 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
299 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254. Similar requirements are imposed by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 107(b)-(d) (1970). The District Court in Boys Markets found
that Tit is impossible for plaintiff to ascertain the exact amount of damage and injury which
plaintiff will sustain if defendant and its members are not enjoined from committing such
acts, and plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3074 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties be-
tween employer and union. 3 °°
Faced with the Court's suggestion that ,there is no adequate legal
remedy to enforce the arbitration and no-strike clauses, it is hardly
surprising that the lower courts have ignored equitable considera-
tions in Boys Markets injunction cases.
In theory, equitable considerations weigh heavily in favor of
the employer. His damages are often impossible to calculate accu-
rately. In addition to lost profits, he may be subject to many breach
of contract suits by his customers. Other customers may be perma-
nently lost. Even if a damage action might provide an adequate
remedy, the employer often cannot adamantly pursue an adequate
award, since he may aggravate industrial strife by seeking large
damages. 30 I Furthermore, the union may be financially incapable of
compensating the employer for his provable losses. 302 Discharge or
discipline of the strikers does not remedy the employer's financial
loss, and may in fact be counter-productive if the employer has a
skilled work force. Only an injunction can secure the uninterrupted
service contemplated by the contract. 3 °3
On the other hand, a union suffers no cognizable injury from
the enjoining of an unlawful strike. 304 Employees suffer no mone-
tary loss by working, since if the arbitrator finds against the
employer, he will have to compensate them for all losses suffered
because of the breach of contract. 3 °5 The union will not suffer
because it can always arbitrate the dispute. 306 Moreover, the injunc-
tion will limit the union's financial liability for its breach of con-
tract. 30 7
300
	 U.S. at 248. The Court quoted the report filed by neutral members of the
American Bar Association's Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee, 2 ABA Labor Relations
Section 241, 242 (1963).
30 ' See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290,
2293 (3d Cir. 1972).
302 Stearns-Roger Corp. v. Millwrights Local 1182, 77 L.R.R.M. 2776 (D, Ariz. 1971).
3 ° 3 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248-49 n.17; Avco, 454 F.2d at 973, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2293.
3°4 See, e.g., Kauai Elec. Co. v. Local 1260, IBEW, 79 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2842 (D.
Hawaii 1971); Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc. v. Restaurant Workers Local 71, 78
L.R.R.M. 2559, 2561 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communica-
tions Workers, 324 F. Supp. 830, 834, 76 L.R.R.M. 3032, 3035 (S.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 454 F.2d 1333, 1337, 79 L.R.R.M. 2480 (5th Cir. 1972) (an injunction would
"seriously damage the Union in the eyes of the employees" by demonstrating the union's
impotence when faced with an employer breach of contract).
305 Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc. v. Restaurant Workers Local 71, 78 L.R.R.M.
2559, 2561 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Favino Mechanical Constr. Ltd. v. Plumbers Local 269, 78 L.R.R.M. 2389, 2393
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
31" Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 343 F. Supp. 1165, 1171,
80 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2517 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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In practice, the equitable considerations have little impact.
Failure to consider those issues may be reversible error, 308 but
purely perfunctory analysis goes unremedied. Many courts have
failed even to consider the relative equities and most have simply
stated, without discussion, that the employer would suffer more
from the denial of an injunction than the unions would from the
grant of relief. 309 The courts have also taken a broad view of the
employer's losses in order to find irreparable injury, looking far
beyond the employer's immediate financial injury. Courts have con-
sidered injuries suffered by non-striking employees, 310 by the
employer's customers, 311 or by the general public312 as part of the
employer's irreparable injury.
Furthermore, on at least two occasions, courts have found
irreparable injury to the employer despite the introduction of con-
siderable evidence to the contrary at the hearing. In Gateway, the
courts ignored evidence negating the employer's claims of irrepara-
ble injury, and based relief on injury to third parties. When
employees struck the Gateway Coal Co., the employer had a forty
day stockpile of coal; a twenty day supply remained when the court
issued a temporary restraining order. 313 The trial court found injury
to Gateway; to Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., a part owner and
customer of Gateway; to non-striking employees and to the general
public. 314 However, neither Jones & Laughlin nor the general public
would themselves suffer until the stockpile was exhausted. Nor was
it likely that Jones & Laughlin would find permanent alternate
sources and cease purchasing from Gateway even if the strike lasted
more than forty days. Only non-striking employees might have
suffered immediate irreparable injury. In any event, neither Jones &
Laughlin, nor the general public nor non-striking employees falls
within the category of a "complainant" or "employer" whose injuries
are part of the equitable considerations which must be weighed
Jo North Am. Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMW, 497 F.2d 459, 464, 86 L.R.R.M. 2339,
2342 (6th Cir. 1974).
309 See, e.g., Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 294, 342 F. Supp. 507, 510,
80 L.R.R.M. 3459, 3461 (N.D.N.Y. 1972); Holland Constr. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs Local
101, 315 F. Supp. 791, 792, 74 L.R.R.M. 3087, 3088 (D. Kan. 1970).
31° Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Dredge Section, 78 L.R.R.M. 2192 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
311
 E.g., Central Appalachian Coal Co. v. UMW, 376 F. Supp, 914, 924, 86 L.R.R.M.
2277, 2285 (S.D.W. Va. 1974).
3 " E.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Operating Eng'rs Local 542, 371 F. Supp.
1130, 1136, 86 L.R.R.M. 2677, 2681 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
3 " Brief for AFL-CIO and UAW as Amiens Curiae at 28-29, Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). The courts implicitly rejected the argument that the presence of a
stockpile negated the employer's claim of irreparable harm. See Gateway Coal Co. v, UMW,
80 L.R.R.M. 2633 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (temporary restraining order).
314 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. 2633 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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before an injunction can be granted under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act315
 or Boys Markets. 316
More seriously, in Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 3 " the Eighth Circuit ignored the district court's findings that
Hanna had an ample stockpile "for an indefinite period of time,"
and that the employer had failed to demonstrate "irreparable injury
outweighing the injury to the defendants and their members if the
injunction was granted."'" Noting only that "the equities are not all
on the side of Hanna,"3 ' 9 the Eighth Circuit issued an injunction. 320
Where a district court has concluded that the evidence supporting a
finding of irreparable harm is insufficient, a reviewing court must
consider only whether the trial court abused its discretion, commit-
ted a legal error, or clearly erred in its consideration of the evi-
dence. 321 Thus, the Eighth Circuit should not have issued an in-
junction without a reasoned analysis justifying its reversal of the
district court's factual findings on the harm suffered by Hanna.
By allowing courts to assume that any strike in breach of
contract may be enjoined, the Supreme Court undermined the re-
straining influence of the equitable requirements. 322 Superficial
analysis of the equitable considerations may result in unwarranted
injunctions where the court's assumptions are unsupported by the
evidence.
6. Judicial Enforcement of the Duty to Arbitrate, Restoration
of the Status Quo, and Injunction Bonds
Boys Markets requires essentially three injunctions: the union is
ordered to terminate its strike and the employer is ordered to arbi-
trate the underlying dispute and to restore the status quo. This
section will examine judicial compliance with the latter two re-
quirements, and their interaction with the bond requirements im-
posed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
a. The Duty to Arbitrate. Boys Markets sought to vindicate
the arbitration process by ordering the employer, as well as the
union, to arbitrate the dispute underlying the union's strike. 323
315
 29 U.S.C. 107(b) (1970) ("That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's
property will follow .	 . .").
316
 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254 ("irreparable injury to the employer").
317
 464 F.2d 565, 80 L.R.R.M. 3268 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
na Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, Civ. No. 72-59 at 6, 12 (D. Minn. 1972).
319 464 F.2d at 568, 80 L.R R.M. at 3270.
320 Id. at 569, 80 L. R. R.M. at 3271.
321
 E.g., Pressmen Local 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 479 F.2d 607, 610, 83 L.R.R.M.
2349, 2350 (3d Cir. 1973).
322 See text at note 300 supra.
313
 398 U.S. at 254.
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Some courts have explicitly ordered the employer to arbitrate. 324
Most courts, however, have merely ordered arbitration, leaving
unclear which party must initiate the process. 325 Others have en-
joined strikes without an explicit order to arbitrate. 326 The Second
Circuit has stated that the failure to order arbitration is reversible
error. 327 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that an
order to arbitrate must be implied in every Boys Markets injunc-
tion. 328
Actual arbitration of the underlying dispute is not necessary to
vindicate the arbitration process. Boys Markets requires unions to
terminate strikes and utilize the grievance procedure as the exclusive
means of challenging employer conduct. If the union does file a
grievance, the employer's procedural defenses under the grievance-
arbitration provisions (e.g., that the grievance is contractually
barred as untimely) should be waived. If the union does not file a
grievance, it should waive its right to contest the employer's ac-
tion. 329
If an order to arbitrate is not implied in any restraining order or
injunction granted under Boys Markets, the timing of the actual
order to arbitrate may be crucial to a union's ability to resolve its
dispute with management. In almost one-third of the cases, the
court did not order arbitration when the strike was originally en-
joined; in two-thirds of these cases, the courts subsequently ordered
the parties to arbitrate. 3" Yet the omission of an order to arbitrate
314 See, e.g., Holland Constr. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 101, 315 F. Supp. 791, 793,
74 L.R.R.M. 3087, 3088 (D. Kan. 1970).
113 See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local 9, 345 F. Supp. 331, 338-39, 80
L.R.R.M. 2987, 2992 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
326 See, e.g., Standard Food Prod. Corp. v. Brandenburg, 76 L.R R.M. 2366, 2367
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 964, 76 L.R.R.M. 2366, 2367 (2d Cir.
1970).
337 Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Teamsters Local 295, 449 F.2d 586, 589, 590-91, 78
L.R.R.M. 2466, 2468, 2470 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 377
F. Supp. 750, 753, 87 L.R.R.M. 2389, 2391 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
28 Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293, 300, 87 L.R.R.M. 2733, 2738
(7th Cir. 1974).
326 The Labor Board has adopted similar policies under its Collyer doctrine. See note 197
supra. The Board requires the respondent to an unfair labor practice charge to disclaim any
intention of raising procedural defenses to arbitration. See, e.g., Gary-Hobart Water Co., 210
N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1211 n.3 (1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284, 289, 88
L.R.R.M. 2830, 2833 (7th Cir. 1975). General Counsel Memorandum, "Arbitration Deferral
Policy under Collyer-Revised Guidelines," reported in 83 Lab. Rel. Rep. 41, 45 (1973).
Where the charging party has refused to arbitrate the statutory issues after deferral under
Collyer, the Board will dismiss an unfair labor practice complaint. See, e.g., Columbia
Typographers Local 101, 214 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 87 L.R.R.M. 1275 (1974); Electronic Repro-
duction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L,R.R.M. 1211, 1215-16 (1974).
33° Analysis of the 63 Boys Markets cases in which injunctions were issued reveals that
in 41 cases, courts simultaneously ordered arbitration and enjoined a strike. In 15 of the
remaining 22 cases courts enjoined a strike and subsequently ordered arbitration. No arbitra-
tion was ordered in 7 cases.
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at any stage of the proceeding may seriously injure the union,
particularly if the actual order to arbitrate is ultimately denied.
Employee support for a strike may irretrievably disappear during
the delay, leaving the union without either a strike or arbitration to
force resolution of the dispute.
After ordering arbitration, several courts have imposed time
limits to prevent undue delay in case the parties disagree on the
selection of the arbitrator, announcing their willingness to select an
arbitrator if the parties cannot agree on a selection within a stipu-
lated period. 331 Courts have also ordered the parties to complete
arbitration expeditiously or within a stipulated period. 332 Such judi-
cial activity is both necessary and appropriate to expedite the resolu-
tion of the underlying dispute and decrease employer-union friction.
b. Restoration of the Status Quo. Courts normally grant re-
straining orders and preliminary injunctions primarily to maintain
the status quo pending a hearing and determination of the merits of a
dispute. 333 A permanent injunction may later issue to prevent the
repetition of a proven legal wrong. 334 Because the status quo is
generally defined as "the last uncontested status which preceded the
controversy,"335 normally it is the defendant who must take action
to restore the status quo. Boys Markets, however, creates a hybrid
order since a return to the "last uncontested status" requires move-
ment by both parties, including the cessation both of the strike and
of the employer action prompting it. In a Boys Markets situation,
there is no proven wrong at the time the strike is enjoined. The
331 See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 343 F. Supp.
1165, 1174, 80 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2519 (S.D. Tex. 1972); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Communications Workers, 75 L.R.R.M. 2178, 2180 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
332
 See, e.g., Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565, 570, 80
L.R.R.M. 3268, 3271 (8th Cir. 1972); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Work-
ers, 343 F. Supp. 1165, 1174, 80 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2519 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Gateway Coal Co.
v. UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. 2633, 2634 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 1157,
80 L.R.R.M. 3153 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
v. Dredge Section, 78 L.R.R.M. 2192, 2193 (N.D. Ohio 1971); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Communications Workers, 75 L.R.R.M. 2178, 2180 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
333 See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 292-93 (1947); National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915, 921, 78 L.R.R.M. 2550, 2555 (2c1 Cir. 1971);
District 50, UMW v. International Union, UMW, 412 F.2d 165, 168, 70 L.R.R.M. 3383,
3384 (D.C. Cir. 1969); American Can Co. v. Steelworkers Local 7420, 350 F. Supp. 810, 812,
81 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2707 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
334
 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Local 134, IBEW, 133 F.2d 955, 957-58 (7th
Cir. 1943).
335
 National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Sombrotto, 449 F.2d 915, 921, 78 L.R.R.M.
2550, 2555 (2d Cir. 1971); accord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free Sewing Mach. Co., 256
F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1958); American Can Co. v. Steelworkers Local 7420, 350 F. Supp.
810, 812, 81 L.R.R.M. 2706, 2707 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Dredge Section, 78 L.R.R.M. 2192, 2193 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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union's strike is subject to an injunction only if the underlying
dispute is arbitrable, with the final decision as to arbitrability left to
the arbitrator. 336 Resolution of the legitimacy of the employer con-
duct prompting the strike is also reserved for the arbitrator. Thus,
each stage of the Boys Markets injunction process may require
restoration of the status quo pending a final decision through the
grievance-arbitration mechanism.
In analogous situations under the Railway Labor Act, district
courts may impose conditions requiring the employer to maintain
the status quo pending resolution of "minor" disputes.'" When
enjoining a strike, the court "must also consider the hardships, if
any, that would arise if the employees were required to await the
[Railroad Adjustment] Board's sometimes long delayed decisions
without recourse to a strike" over the "minor" dispute. 338 The trial
court should consider the possible need for conditional relief in each
case arising under the Act, although the granting of such relief is
purely within its equitable discretion.'"
While an employer's restoration of the status quo may be im-
practical in certain factual circumstances, Boys Markets and many
of its progeny have failed even to consider the propriety of such
relief. In Boys Markets itself, this failure was excusable. The
employer had completed the disputed action before the union could
announce its grievance, so that restoration of the last uncontested
status would have required the employer to leave shelves unstocked
pending the arbitrator's award. 34° Clearly, that solution would have
been intolerable. On the other hand, conditional relief is particularly
appropriate where a union strikes to protest unilateral changes in
the terms of employment, unjust discipline and discharge, or
dangerous safety conditions. Thus, in Gateway, the Supreme Court
specifically approved the grant of conditional relief in a safety dis-
pute. 341
In no reported case has the failure to consider conditional relief
appeared to seriously harm the union. For example, two courts
336 See text at notes 166-204 supra.
337 Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1960).
338 Id. at 534. A similar statutory rule requiring maintenance of the status quo applies
while the parties exhaust their remedies under the "major" dispute provisions of the Act. See
45 U.S.C. § 152, 155-56, 160 (1970); Detroit & T.S. Line R.R. v. Transportation Union, 396
U.S. 142, 150-52 (1969).
339 Railway Express Agencies, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 437 F.2d 388,
394-95, 76 L.R.R.M. 2328, 2332-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971).
349 See note 42 supra.
J41
 414 U.S. at 387; accord, Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565,
569, 80 L,R.R.M. 3268, 3271 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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denied conditional relief in jurisdictional disputes. 342 In such dis-
putes, the controversy involves the legitimacy of the employer's
choice between competing unions, and conditional relief satisfactory
to the striking union would merely provoke the chosen union. In
some circumstances, however, the denial of conditional relief may
have a very serious impact on individual employees, particularly on
a discharged employee, since long delayed monetary relief may not
restore his credit rating or compensate for his past inability to care
for his family. 343
The grant of conditional relief restoring the status quo pending
arbitration may be especially significant if the union could not
obtain similar relief in an independent action against the employer.
Especially after Boys Markets, a union usually will obey any
employer directive and then file a grievance if it desires to challenge
the directive. Pending resolution of the dispute through the
grievance-arbitration mechanism, a union may initiate an indepen-
dent suit to enjoin unilateral employer action if the immediate
impact of the unilateral action might be to thwart resolution of the
dispute through arbitration. 344 Note, however, that if a union could
obtain conditional relief in a Boys Markets situation without meeting
the requirements for injunctive relief against the employer pending
arbitration in an independent action, a strike might be a useful
litigation tactic. 345
 An analysis of the reported cases shows that
many courts have not applied the irreparable harm standard in
granting requests for conditional relief. Some courts have granted
conditional relief in cases in which back pay awards would presum-
342
 Frommeyer & Co. v. Bricklayers Local 64, 87 L.R.R.M. 2512 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
McCord, Condron & McDonald, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1822, 464 F.2d 1036, 80 L.R.R.M.
3374 (5th Cir. 1972).
343
 See Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Teamsters Local 295, Civ. No. 71-C-452 (E.D.N.Y.
filed June 11, 1971), vacated, 449 F.2d 586, 78 L.R.R.M. 2466 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
3" Under either the Railway Labor Act or § 301, a union must demonstrate that an
arbitrator cannot remedy the injury suffered by employees in order to meet the equitable
requirement of a showing of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
v. Typographers Local 18, 471 F.2d 872, 875-77, 82 L.R.R.M. 2332, 2334-36 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); Railway Clerks Local 2144 v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 409 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1969). Typically, courts will enjoin unilateral changes that
pose safety hazards, or involve layoffs or the relocation of employees. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 636, 640-41, 76
L.R.R.M. 2665, 2668 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Railway Express, 409 F.2d at 317-18. The union must
also demonstrate some likelihood of success "in obtaining the award in aid of which the
injunction is sought." Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1974).
345
 The union, of course, would have to weigh its potential liability for damages for a
strike in breach of contract.
3" See, e.g., Harmony Dairy Co. v. Teamsters Local 205, 82 L.R.R.M. 2773, 2778-79
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (pension contributions); Kauai Elec. Co. v. Local 1260, IBEW, 79 L.R.R.M.
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ably recompense employees, 346 On the other hand, one court
granted conditional relief only after finding that an arbitral award of
money damages might not remedy the harm to employee
seniority rights. 347 Unless courts adopt the irreparable injury stan-
dard for conditional relief in Boys Markets situations, a union might
attempt to protect its members by striking to provoke an injunction.
c. Injunction Bonds. Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prohibits the issuance of restraining orders and preliminary injunc-
tions unless the complainant files a bond sufficient to recompense
those enjoined for any damages suffered from the erroneous issuance
of an injunction. 348 Damages specifically include reasonable attor-
ney's fees and all other expenses incurred in defending against an
erroneously issued order. 349 The bond required under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is similar, excluding only the recovery of
attorney's fees. 35 ° Although no bond is required statutorily before
the issuance of a permanent injunction, 35 ' the trial court has dis-
cretionary authority to require one. 352
The reported decisions disclose a lack of uniform compliance
with the statutory bonding requirements in Boys Markets suits
against unions. In several cases courts apparently failed to require
bonds as a pre-condition of either the, initial order or the final
order. 353 Furthermore, the bond required by some courts may not
be sufficient to compensate a wrongfully enjoined union. One of the
most frequent reported bond amounts is $1,000. Even after the
Second Circuit ruled this "nominal" sum "hardly adequate under the
2838, 2844 (D. Hawaii 1971) (work rule changes); American Can Co. v. International Bhd. of
Pulp Workers, 77 L.R.R.M. 2633 (D. Ore. 1971) (work rule changes); Stein Printing Co. v.
Typographers Local 48, 329 F. Supp. 754, 759, 77 L.R.R.M. 3084, 3087 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(discharges); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 75 L.R.R.M. 2178, 2180
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (wage increase).
545 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 343 F. Supp. 1165, 1174,
80 L.R.R.M. 2513, 2519 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
345 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
345 Id. The bonding requirements of § 7 remain in effect, despite the "accommodation"
of Norris-LaGuardia in Boys Markets. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483,
488-89, 79 L.R.R.M. 2519, 2522 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
3 " Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); see United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 488, 79
L. R.R.M. 2519, 2521-22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972). See generally Atomic Oil
Co. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1063
(1970).
551 The bonding requirements of § 7 apply only to temporary orders. 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1970). Bond is required under Rule 65(c) only to protect the defendant against the erroneous
issuance of injunctive relief priOr to a full hearing on the merits. United States v. Onan, 190
F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir. 1951) (dictum).
553 Costs, excluding attorney's fees and damages, incurred in successfully appealing the
issuance of a preliminary or permanent injunction are recoverable. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a), (c).
555 See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Corp. v, Local 1487, UMW, 68 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 12951 at
23908 (E.D. Ill. 1971).
943
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Act's standards,"354 several courts regarded such inadequate bonds
as sufficient. 355
Courts have required significantly higher bonds from unions
when enjoining unilateral employer action pending arbitration. 356 In
addition to attorney's fees, a union bond has been required to
reimburse the employer for "wages and fringe benefits paid . . .
pursuant to the injunction if the ultimate determination by the
arbitrator indicates that the injunctive relief was improvidently
granted."357 The arbitrator's ultimate award is an improper basis
for recovery since arbitrability of the dispute, potential irreparable
injury, and likelihood of success determine whether the injunction
was proper. Ultimate loss before the arbitrator on the merits does
not determine whether earlier protective relief was justified. 3" Few
unions can post the high bonds often required in an independent
action to enjoin employer action pending arbitration. 359
Large bonds have not, however, been required when condi-
tional relief pending arbitration is granted as part of a Boys Markets
injunction. In ten of the thirteen cases in which conditional relief
was granted, the court did not discuss the need for a union bond. 36°
"a Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Teamsters Local 295, 449 F.2d 586, 591, 78 L.R.R.M.
2466, 2470 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 	 1006 (1971),
355
number
Bond Amount	 Pre-Emery
reported cases
Post-Emery
500 la 2
1,000 5 3
2,000 — 1°
2,500 — 2
5,000 6 a, c 3
6,500 1 —
10,000 3c 2°
20,000
150,000
1
—
—
2
a Includes TRO bond raised to 5,000 for PI.
° Includes TRO bond raised to 10,000 for PI.
a Includes TRO bond raised to 10,000 for PI.
376 See, e.g., Typographers Local 18 v. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, 81
L.R.R.M. 2797, 2799 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ($15,000); Pressmen Local 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co.,
Si L.R.R.M. 2438 (3d Cir. 1972) ($25,000); Local 757, UAW v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42,
48, 81 L.R.R.M. 2414, 2419 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ($100,000).
357
 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc., 319 F. Supp.
636, 641, 76 L.R.R.M. 2665, 2669 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
35e
	 Blaw-Knox, id., with the picket line cases, notes 206-27 supra and accom-
panying text. If the Blatv-Knox focus on the award in determining recovery on the bond is
correct, unions enjoined on the Monongahela-NAPA theory should recover on the employer's
bond if they win before the arbitrator. See, e.g., Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local
425, 519 F.2d 263, 269, 89 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3077 (8th Cir. 1975).
35°
 See, e.g., Hoh v, Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 559 n.6, 560 n.8, 85 L.R.R.M. 2517,
2519 n.6, 2520 n.8 (2d Cir. 1974).
la° See, e.g., Kauai Elec. Co. v, Local 1260, IBEW, 79 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2844 (D.
Hawaii 1971).
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In one of the remaining cases, the court released an employer's bond
because both parties had been granted equitable relief. 3" Another
court ordered each party to post a nominal bond. 362 The third court
ordered the union to post a $20,000 bond, which it later released. 363
In granting conditional relief collateral to a Boys Markets injunc-
tion, courts apparently have not linked a union bond requirement to
the employer's potential damage if the conditional relief is later
found to have been inappropriate. Until courts require a bond
reasonably related to the employer's potential recovery, a strike to
provoke an injunction may be a useful litigation tactic. 364
B. The Substantive Requirements Imposed by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act
While Boys Markets seemingly adopted several of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act requirements for the granting of an injunction, 365
the Court did not expressly consider whether the Act itself applies in
Boys Markets situations, stating only that section 4, the absolute
prohibition of injunctions against strikes, must be accommodated
with section 301. 366 In the Railway Labor Act cases, the Court has
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the policies behind it apply
only to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Railway Labor
Act. 367 In Boys Markets situations, courts have applied the same
test and have found only one provision of Norris-LaGuardia, section
361 Stein Printing Co. v. Typographers Local 48, 329 F. Supp. 754, 759 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
362 American Can Co. v. International Bhd. of Pulp Workers, 77 L.R.R.M. 2633 (D.
Ore. 1971) ($1,000).
363 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 343 F. Supp. 1165, 1173-74
(S.D. Tex. 1972).
364 But see note 345 supra.
365
 A court must find under both Boys Markets and the Act:
(a) that substantial and irreparable injury to a complainant's property would follow
from the denial of the injunction, 398 U.S. at 254, 29 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1970);
(b) that as to each item of relief granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief, 398 U.S. at 254, 29 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1970);
(c) that complainant has no adequate remedy at law, 398 U.S. at 254, 29 U.S.C.
§ 107(d) (1970);
(d) that the employer has made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute either by
negotiation or with the aid of any available machinery of mediation or voluntary
arbitration, see 398 U.S. at 254, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
Judicial treatment of these requirements has been analyzed above.
366 398 U.S. at 250; accord, Gateway, 414 U.S. at 380-81. But see Granny Goose, 415
U.S. at 445 n.19.
30 Virginian Ry. v. Railway Employees System Fed'n 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937). See
also Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Railway Clerks, 437 F.2d 388, 395, 76 L.R.R.M. 2328,
2332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's
Union, 292 F.2d 61, 71, 48 L.R.R.M. 2412, 2420 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 936
(1962).
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4, completely inconsistent with section 301. 368 It is submitted that,
with one exception, all Norris-LaGuardia requirements not ex-
pressly incorporated in Boys Markets should be applied in Boys
Markets suits for injunctive relief.
1. Burden of Proof and Findings of Fact
Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act requires the complainant
to provide the court with an evidentiary basis for the requisite find-
ings of fact. 369 In Granny Goose, the Supreme Court, without refer-
ring to Norris-LaGuardia, emphasized that the burden of proving the
appropriateness of injunctive relief was on the employer. 37° Logi-
cally, then, the employer seeking a Boys Markets injunction must
allege and prove that the requirements of Boys Markets have been
satisfied. Some courts have indicated, however, that where a union
strikes without divulging the nature of its grievance, the employer
need not allege and prove that an arbitrable dispute provoked the
strike. 371
 That doctrine cannot be reconciled with Boys Markets, for
absent an arbitrable grievance Norris-LaGuardia and Boys Markets
expressly forbid injunctive relief.
In every action filed under section 301, the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard applies to all contested factual issues. 372
Thus, the employer need not bring out clear proof that the union
has ratified or participated in the strike to obtain injunctive relief
against the union under Boys Markets, as he would if the basis of
his demand for injunctive relief was the violent or unlawful acts of
union members. 373
Under both the Act374 and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
3°8
 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf. of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972, 975-76
n.8, 84 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2557 n.8 (7th Cir, 1973); Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW,
457 F.2d 162, 165, 79 L.R.R.M. 2845, 2847 (7th Cir. 1972); United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 487-89, 79 L.R.R.M. 2519, 2520-22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923
(1972); Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Teamsters, Local 295, 449 F.2d 586, 588, 591, 78
L.R.R.M. 2466, 2467-68, 2470 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972); New York
Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445 F.2d 39, 49-50, 77 L.R.R.M. 2785, 2792-93 (2d
Cir. 1971).
369
 29 U.S.C. §11 107, 109 (1970).
37° Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 443.
32I
 Parade Publications, Inc. v. Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369, 373 n.3, 80 L.R.R.M.
2264, 2266 n.3, 80 L.R.R.M. 2264, 2266 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972); see Morning Telegraph v.
Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 100-02, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2714 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
954 (1972); cf. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 74 L.R.R.M. 2607, 2608 (W.D. Pa.),
rev'd, 74 L.R.RM. 2611, 2612-13 (3d Cir. 1970).
332
 See, e.g., Bartels v. Lithographers Local 1-P, 306 F. Supp. 1266, 1272, 73 L.R.R.M.
2154, 2158 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd per curiam, 431 F.2d 1205, 75 L.R.R.M. 2400 (2d Cir.
1970); Machinists Lodge 37 v. Higgins, 239 F. Supp. 252, 254, 58 L.R.RM. 2539, 2541 (E.D.
La. 1965); cf. Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302, 308, 311 (1971).
373
 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 185(e), with 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1970). See UMW v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 736 (1966); H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1947).
324
 29 U.S.C.	 109 (1970).
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dure, 375 a court's failure to file findings of fact in connection with
the grant of equitable relief is reversible error. 376 However, a court's
failure to issue simultaneous findings of fact does not affect its
contempt jurisdiction377 unless the failure renders the order too
vague to be enforceable. 378
2. Public Officers
While Norris-LaGuardia removes judicial authority to restrain
peaceful strike activity, 379 Congress left unchanged the preexisting
equitable jurisdiction to restrain violence and fraud, although the
employer must demonstrate that public officials are unwilling or
unable to protect the continued operation of the employer's busi-
ness. 38° Where violence occurs during an otherwise lawful strike,
the court's equity jurisdiction is not grounded on section 301, and
adherence to the requirements of Boys Markets is unnecessary.
Conversely, where the basis of the claim for injunctive relief is Boys
Markets, a finding that public officers cannot protect the employer's
property is irrelevant."'
3. Scope of the Order—Acts Enjoined
Section 9 of the Act permits an order prohibiting only those
unlawful acts expressly alleged in the complaint and expressly set
forth in the court's finding of facts. 382 Furthermore, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require courts to specify in reasonable
detail the acts to be restrained. 383 Those limitations upon the court's
equitable powers prohibit blanket injunctions by confining the order
to the illegal acts complained of and found by the court and by
notifying the party enjoined of the precise limits placed upon its
conduct.'" Despite those requirements, the employer's attorney,
375 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
376 See McCord, Condron, & McDonald, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1822, 464 F.2d 1036,
80 L.R.R.M. 3374, 3375 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
377 Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. UMW, 476 F.2d 860, 862, 82 L.R.R.M. 2601, 2603 (3d
Cir. 1973).
378 See Longshoremen's Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64,
73-76 (1967).
"9 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
3s9 Id. § 107(a), (e) (1970); see Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz, Ill F.2d 971, 977 (7th
Cir. 1940).
"I United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 488, 79 L.R.R.M. 2519, 2521 (3d
Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
382 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1970).
383 Fed. It. Civ. P. 65(d). See generally Comment, Developments in the Law—
Injunctions, 78 Harv. L, Rev. 994, 1064-69 (1965).
384 Longshoremen's Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 74-76
(1967); Virginian Ry. v. Railway Employees System Fed'n 40, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937);
Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 473 F.2d 244, 247, 82 L.R.R.M. 2023, 2024 (2d Cir.
1972).
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who naturally seeks the broadest possible relief, often determines
the scope of the order since the judge may simply adopt his pro-
posed draft. Consequently, the order is often overbroad, posing grave
dangers for those enjoined since they may easily be found in con-
tempt unless a reviewing court subsequently restricts the scope of
the decree. 385
Courts have not strictly complied with the rules prohibiting
overbroad orders. In Boys Markets, the district court carefully lim-
ited its order to the specific dispute involved. 386 Other courts,
however, have been less precise, and have broadly prohibited
strikes over "any arbitrable dispute," 387 or even "any dispute."388
Perhaps not suprisingly, these broad orders are most frequently
issued ex parte. 389 One might therefore assume that orders issued
upon notice and after argument will be more precise, although even
litigation will not ensure precision. 39° Either union attorneys are
unaware that courts can be required to tailor their orders to the
specific complaint, or courts are unresponsive to their arguments.
The former possibility appears more likely, since most courts ex-
pressly considering the issue have chosen a narrow order or nar-
rowly interpreted an apparently broad order. 391 Where a union has
shown a general tendency to strike rather than arbitrate, it has been
held that Boys Markets permits a broad injunction against all possi-
ble breaches in order to promote arbitration. 392 The Seventh Circuit
323
 New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445 F.2d 39, 48-49, 77 L.R.R.M.
2785, 2792 (2d Cir. 1971).
336 See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 70 L.R.R.M. 3071, 3076 (C.D.
Cal. 1969). The court enjoined various acts in connection with, related to or in furtherance of
a strike or work stoppage against plaintiff involving the pending dispute as to the stocking of
frozen foods." Id. at 3076. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewery Drivers Local 133, 346
F. Supp. 702, 707, 81 L.R.R.M. 2673, 2676 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
3 " See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 68 CCH Lab. Cas.11 12951 at
23908, 23910-11 (E.D. 111. 1971), vacated in pertinent part, 457 F.2d 162, 165, 79 L.R.R.M.
2845, 2847 (7th Cir. 1972).
3" See, e.g., American Can Co. v. International Bhd. of Pulp Workers, 77 L.R.R.M.
2633 (D. Ore. 1971).
3" See, e.g., Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc. v. Restaurant Workers Local 71, 79
L.RR.M. 2502, 2503 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Steams-Roger Corp. v. Millwrights Local 1182, 77
L.R.R.M. 2776 (D. Ariz. 1971); Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 76
L.R.R.M. 2113, 2114 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
3" See, e.g., Hilton Intl Co. v. Asociacion de Empleados, 324 F. Supp. 492, 493-94, 77
L.R.R.M. 2622, 2623-24 (D.P.R. 1971); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 74 L.R.R.M.
2607, 2608, 2611 (W.D. Pa.), vacated on other grounds, 74 L.R.R.M. 2611, 2613 (3d Cir.
1970).
391
 See, e.g., Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 457 F.2d 162, 165, 79
L.R.R.M. 2845, 2847 (7th Cir. 1972); New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445
F.2d 39, 47-50, 77 L.R.R.M. 2791-93 (2d Cir.), rev'g 77 L.R.R.M. 2780 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Herald Co. v. Hopkins, 325 F. Supp. 1232, 1234, 79 L.R.R.M. 2199, 2201 (N.D.N.Y. 1971);
cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 911 (1971).
393 Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d 950, 953, 87 L.R.R.M. 2078,
948
BOYS MARKETS DECISION
specifically approved an order incorporating the parties' grievance
provision, holding that the order was not too vague because the
union could reasonably interpret its own contract and because the
union could seek a declaratory judgment in close cases. 393 That
conclusion is inconsistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act require-
ment that the employer prove actual or threatened unlawful activ-
ity. 394 Simply stated, the Act looks to more than the employer's
fears and the union's past tendencies.
Once a court enjoins a strike, it may enjoin a wide variety of
collateral supporting activity, including picketing, interference with
the employer's operations, and any other activity promoting the
strike. 395
4. Scope of the Order—Persons Enjoined
Section 7(a) of the Act permits courts to issue an injunction
against any person or organization committing or threatening an
unlawful act, or authorizing or ratifying an unlawful act after actual
knowledge thereof. 396 The order binds the parties to the action,
those in active concert with them and their privies with actual
knowledge of the order. 397 The number of persons explicitly covered
by the order is, therefore, irrelevant. 398 Thus, an injunction against
a union presumably would prohibit strike activity by any union
members with actual knowledge of the order, because of the privity
relationship involved. 399 Accordingly, courts should refuse to issue
any injunction where there is no unity of interest among the defen-
dant union and its striking members, In those circumstances, the
member employees are virtually unrepresented in the injunction
2080 (7th Cir. 1974). See C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. UMW, 372 F. Supp. 846, 853, 84
L.R.R.M. 2885, 2890-91 (D. Colo. 1973), affd, 507 F.2d 170, 87 L.R.R.M. 3197 (10th Cir.
1974). Contra, United States Steel Corp, v, UMW, — F.2d 90 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2544-46
(5th Cir. 1975).
393 Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMW, 500 F.2d 950, 953-54, 87 L.R.R.M. 2078,
2080 (7th Cir. 1974). This procedure was specifically criticized in United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, — F.2d —, 90 L.R.R.M. 2539, 2545-46 (5th Cir. 1975).
394 29 U.S.C: § 107(a) (1970).
395 See, e,g., Avco Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974, 80 L.R.R.M. 2290,
2294 (3d Cir. 1971).
396 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970).
397 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179-80
(1973); Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1945); In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548,
554 (1897).
396 "A person who knowingly assists a defendant in violating an injunction" is liable in
contempt regardless of the scope of the decree. Backo v. Carpenters and Joiners Local 281,
438 F.2d 176, 180, 76 L.R.R.M. 2184, 2187 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971),
quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
399 But see Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 497 F.2d 311, 86 L.R.R.M.
2337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), holding that an injunction against a
sympathy strike could only apply to union encouragement and not to strike activities by
individual members. Id. at 312, 86 L.R.R.M. at 2337-38.
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proceeding, yet must risk a contempt proceeding to determine the
order's force. Conversely, the enjoined union and its officers are
obligated to end any strike, even one by members they cannot
contro1. 40° The vicariously represented members and the vicariously
responsible officials may each find themselves unable to avoid con-
tempt of the order. Thus, to avoid such vicarious liability, which is
repugnant to due process of law,"' injunctive relief should be
totally avoided when it is apparent that the defendant union and its
members are openly at odds.
C. The Procedural Framework
The general procedure for obtaining an injunction is relatively
simple. The plaintiff initiates the process by filing a verified com-
plaint,402
 generally accompanied by sworn affidavits alleging the
substantive prerequisites for equitable relief. 403 The complaint may
conclude with a prayer for a permanent injunction. However, there
is often need for temporary relief in the interval before the issuance
of a permanent injunction. Courts will, therefore, entertain a mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant until
the hearing on the merits. 404 After the hearing, the restraining order
will either terminate or merge into a preliminary injunction, which
will preserve the status quo until the final decision is rendered.
While temporary and preliminary relief are not procedural pre-
requisites for a permanent injunction, plaintiffs frequently seek such
relief in labor disputes."'
Despite this simplicity, courts have encountered great difficulty
in following the procedural standards established in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Judicial Code. As the practitioner well
realizes, these procedural rules often determine the practical result
of the litigation. This is particularly true in labor litigation, where
the timing and duration of an injunction may permanently affect the
relationship between an employer and a union. This section will
evaluate the Boys Markets decisions under the procedural standards
established by Congress and the Supreme Court.
1. Removal
Federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of any civil
action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating
400 See text at notes 256-64 supra.
4° 1 North Am. Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMW, 497 F.2d 459, 466, 86 L.R.R.M. 2339,
2344 (6th Cir. 1974).
4°1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(6).
403 Id.
404 See, e.g., Major v. Sowers, 297 F. Supp. 664, 666 (D. La. 1969).
4°5
 An appendix listing the type of relief sought in Boys Markets injunction cases is
available for inspection at the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review,
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commerce . . . ."406 Plaintiffs may thus invoke either original federal
jurisdiction through a suit under section 301, or any independent
state jurisdiction which may exist. 407 Any breach of contract suit
initiated in state court and covered by section 301 may be removed
to federal courts under the federal removal statute.408 Twenty-six of
the first one hundred Boys Markets cases were initiated in state
courts and removed, but in only seven could the unions perfect
removal to the federal court before the state court had acted upon
the complaints. Once removal is perfected, a state injunction "re-
main[s) in full force until dissolved or modified by the district
court."'"
In Granny Goose, the Supreme Court accomodated the removal
statute with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and ruled that
"[amn ex parte temporary restraining order issued by a state court
prior to removal remains in force after removal no longer than it
would have remained in effect under state law, but in no event does
the order remain in force longer than the time limitations imposed
by Rule 65(b), measured from the date of removal."410 Thus, a
removed, ex parte state court restraining order can be effective for
no longer than ten days unless the federal court extends the order
upon the employer's showing of good cause. 4 t 1 The employer must
then obtain a grant of continuing relief in federal court, since the
denial of a union's motion to dissolve a state order does not operate
as a grant of preliminary relief by the federal court. 412 Pursuant to
Granny Goose, a district court must promptly schedule hearings on
the employer's motion for a preliminary injunction or allow the
removed state order to expire within ten days. 413 Prior to Granny
406 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
407
 Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1968); see Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
40s
	 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970); Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 245 n.11; Avco, 390 U.S. at 560.
Within 30 days after receipt of the initial pleadings stating a removable cause or of the
service of summons if no pleading is served (but before a final adjudication), a defendant may
file a verified petition seeking removal to the district court for the district and division within
which the state action is pending. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(a), (b) (1970). The petition must contain
a short statement of the facts allowing removal and a copy of all process, pleadings and
orders. Id. § 1446(a). The defendant must also file a surety bond to pay all costs resulting from
improper removal. Id. § 1446(d). After filing the petition and bond notifying all adverse
parties, the defendant must then notify the clerk of the state court, Upon compliance with
these procedural requirements, jurisdiction automatically vests in the federal district court.
Id. § 1446(e). The district court may remand the case and award costs if, before final
judgment, it appears that removal was improper. Id. § 1447(c). There is no review of a
remand order in a section 301 case. Id. § 1447(d). Appalachian Volunteers, Inc. v. Clark, 432
F.2d 530, 533 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
4° 9 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970).
4 '° Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 439-40. See text at note 115 supra.
41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
411 Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 440, 445.
413 Id. at 440.
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Goose, some courts, acting upon the assumption that they were also
granting preliminary injunctions, merely denied union motions to
dissolve." In the long run, however, Granny Goose's impact will
be slight, since employers will routinely request a preliminary in-
junction and an expedited hearing once a union removes a section
301 action.
Once an action has been removed, the parties must consider the
differences between state requirements for injunctive relief and the
requirements of Boys Markets. One federal court dismissed a state
court complaint which failed to allege an arbitrable grievance,"
Another court apparently permitted the employer to amend the
complaint initiated in state court and prove the presence of an
arbitrable issue. 416
2. Temporary Restraining Order
A temporary restraining order is used to restore and preserve
the last peaceful status quo until the propriety of a preliminary
injunction can be determined. A court may grant a restraining order
upon a showing of an actual emergency or of threats of future acts
which can be anticipated with reasonable probability and which
present a danger of irreparable harm to the complainant."' A
petitioner may obtain emergency equitable relief only upon a "prima
facie showing" of his right to ultimate relief."
In Granny Goose, the Supreme Court indicated that Rule 65(b)
establishes the minimum standards for the issuance of an ex parte
temporary restraining order. 419
 Rule 65(b) permits ex parte orders
only if the specific facts alleged in the verified complaint or accom-
panying affidavits demonstrate that immediate and irreparable in-
jury to the complainant will occur before the adverse party can be
heard. 42° The Rule further requires the applicant to specify in
writing his efforts to give notice and to explain why notice should
not be required. 421
 An ex parte order is effective for ten days, but
within that period, the order may be extended for a ten day period
4 " See, e.g., Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99, 78 L.R.FL M. 2710, 2712 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
4k' Adams Stone Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 367 F. Supp. 956, 957 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
4 " See Parade Publications, Inc. v. Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369, 371, 80 L.R.R.M.
2264, 2265 (3d Cir. 1972).
417 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
4" See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewers and Maltsters Local 6, 80 L.R.R.M. 2914
(E.D. Mo. 1972).
419 See 415 U.S. at 438-39.
42° Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
421
 Id. 65(6)(2). This second requirement was added in 1966 "to make it plain that
informal notice, which may be communicated to the attorney rather than the adverse party, is
to be preferred to no notice at all." Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Amend-
ments to Rules, 39 F.R.D. 69, 125 (1966).
952
BOYS MARKETS DECISION
without the adverse party's consent if the complainant demonstrates
a good cause, or for an unlimited period with his consent. 422 There
is no limitation on the duration of a restraining order issued after
notice.423
Rule 65(e) specifies that the Federal Rules "do not modify any
statute of the United States relating to temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions in actions affecting employer and
employee, "424 a clear reference to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In
Granny Goose, the Supreme Court specifically reserved considera-
tion of whether Norris-LaGuardia rather than the Rules establishes
the procedural requirements in Boys Markets cases. 425 Nevertheless,
many lower courts have held that litigants must comply with the
restrictive procedural requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 426
Courts issuing injunctions enforcing the Railway Labor Act have
also applied the Norris-LaGuardia Act standards to the extent that
they are not inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Railway
Labor Act. 427 Since Boys Markets allows courts to issue orders
which Congress expressly precluded, it is only reasonable that they
precisely follow all other conditions upon which Congress would
have permitted relief. 428
Section 7 removes federal court jurisdiction to issue preliminary
and permanent injunctions in labor disputes "except after hearing
the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for
cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made
422 Fed. R. Civ, P. 65(b). See also Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1947).
423 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see, e.g., Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99, 78
L.R.R.M. 2710, 2712-13 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
424 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(e). The 1948 amendments substituted the quoted language for the
words "do not modify ... the Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90 (47 Stat. 70), U.S.C., Title 29, c.
6 . ." Compare the 1939 amendments to the Federal Rules, 308 U.S. 645, 745 (1939), with
the 1948 amendments, 335 U.S. 919, 932 (1948). The Advisory Committee noted that
"[s]pecific enumeration of statutes dealing with labor injunctions is undesirable due to the
enactment of amendatory or new legislation from time to time." 8 F.R.D. 591, 59B (1948).
425
 415 U.S, at 445 0.19.
426 United States Steel Corp. v, UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 487.88, 79 L.R.R.M. 2518, 2521
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S, 923 (1972) ("Certainly the requirements of a verified com-
plaint, notice and a hearing in open court in no way conflict with the policies of the
Labor-Management Relations Act."); Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Teamsters Local 295, 449
F.2d 586, 588, 591, 78 L.R.R.M. 2466, 2467-68, 2470 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1066 (1972). See Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc. v. Restaurant Workers Local 71, 79
L,R,R.M. 2502, 2506 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Barnes & Tucker Co. v. District 2, UMW, 338 F.
Supp. 924, 925-26, 80 L.R.R.M. 2316, 2317-18 (W.D. Pa. 1972). But see Transamerican
Trailer Trans., Inc. v. Seafarers Intl, 336 F. Supp. 1052, 1054, 80 L.R.R.M. 2965, 2966
(D.P.R. 1971).
422 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Railway Clerks,
437 F.2d 388, 395, 76 L.R.R.M. 2328, 2332 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971).
426
 But see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln
Mills, the Supreme Court held that strict compliance with § 7 was unnecessary because
specific performance of an arbitration clause was not prohibited by § 4. Id. at 457-59.
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under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered . . . ”429
The court must ensure that each person against whom relief is
sought has received "due and personal knowledge" of the hear-
ing.431:' Where the complainant alleges that issuance of a temporary
restraining order without notice is necessary to avoid substantial
and irreparable injury, the court may issue such an order "upon tes-
timony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in
issuing a [preliminary] injunction upon a hearing after notice." 431
This ex parte restraining order is effective "for no longer than five
days" before becoming void. 432
Three obvious distinctions exist between the requirements of
Rule 65 and section 7 for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order. Section 7 requires the complainant to present oral evidence
rather than mere affidavits supporting his claim for temporary re-
lief. 433 Section 7 requires ex parte temporary orders to expire in five
days, rather than ten. 434 Section 7 does not provide for extensions of
the order. Obviously, section 7 affords a defendant significant ad-
vantages, since in ex parte cases the judge can question the com-
plainant's witnesses and assess their credibility and in notice cases the
defendant's counsel may cross-examine those witnesses and present
his own case. Application of section 7 also means that the longest
temporary order to which the defendant can be subject lasts five
days rather than twenty.435
Measured against either section 7 or Rule 65, it is clear that
courts have not afforded unions the required protections. Of the
429 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
13° Id.
431 Id. See Emery Air Freight Corp, v. Teamsters Local 295, 449 F.2d 586, 78
L.R.R.M. 2466 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972):
Section 107 apparently contemplates oral testimony as a prerequisite for the issuance
of restraining orders. We need not consider those situations in which the claim may
be made that the taking of such testimony is impossible and affidavits must be relied
upon: the district court made no such finding here.
Id. at 591 n.2, 78 L.R.R.M. at 2470 n.2 (citations omitted). Accord, Hoh v. Pepsico, 491
F.2d 556, 560, 85 L.R.R.M. 2517, 2519-20 (2d Cir, 1974).
432 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970). However, this limitation does not preclude the court from
continuing an order once hearings on a preliminary injunction have begun. Toledo, P. at
W.R.R. v. Railroad Trainmen Lodge 27, 132 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1942), rev'd on other
grounds, 321 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1944).
433 See note 431 supra. Hut see Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 516 F.2d 242, 89
L.R.R.M. 2372 (3d Cir. 1975). In Celotex, the Third Circuit indicated that the accommoda-
tion of section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act would allow the issuance of a temporary
restraining order without oral testimony in some circumstances. Id. at 247-48, 89 L.R.R.M. at
2376 (dictum).
434
 See note 432 supra; Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 516 F,2d 242, 248, 89
L.R.R.M. 2372, 2376 (3d Cir. 1975).
435
 Rule 65(b) is more extensive than § 7 in terms of the protections provided in its
special requirement of an affidavit of attempt to serve notice. See note 421 supra and
accompanying text.
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twenty known ex parte orders, only three courts cited the filing of a
Rule 65 affidavit. 436 Of the fifteen ex parte orders with known
duration, none expired within five days as required by section 7 and
only nine complied with the twenty day maximum of Rule 65. 437
Oral testimony was required in none of the fourteen ex parte hear-
ings, but was required at twelve of the nineteen hearings with
notice. 438 Not surprisingly, courts were more likely to grant a request
for an ex parte order than to grant an order after a hearing with
notice. 439
Even when the statutory restrictions are carefully followed, the
availability of a temporary restraining order offers obvious potential
for abuse. The order must be obeyed under threat of contempt, yet
it is not appealable. 44° To meet this problem, Rule 65(b) permits a
party opposing an ex parte order to appear and move for the
dissolution or modification of the order. 441 The court must resolve
such motions expeditiously. 442 Similarly, after issuing an ex parte
order, the court must schedule a hearing on the preliminary injunc-
tion "at the earliest possible time." 443 It may, however, be impossi-
ble in some circumstances to schedule a hearing, much less to
resolve disputed factual and legal issues, within the statutory time
limits. Obviously, the potential for abuse is decreased where orders
issue only after full evidentiary hearings or where orders issue on
affidavits but are extended after prompt evidentiary hearings.
Nonetheless, the defendant's opportunity to contest the complain-
ant's factual or legal assertions does not guarantee accurate resolu-
tion by the court. The defendant may stipulate to a preliminary or
permanent injunction to appeal the underlying order. 444 Yet by
choosing that tactic, the defendant forfeits his opportunity to liti-
436 Celotex Corp. v. Oil Workers Union, 516 F.2d 242, 247 n.7, 89 L.R.R.M. 2373, 2376
n.7 (3d Cir. 1974); New York Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 445 F.2d 39, 42, 77
L.R.R.M. 2785, 2786 (2d Cir. 1971); Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc. v. Restaurant
Workers Local 71, 79 L.R.R.M. 2502, 2503 (E.D.N,Y. 1972).
437
 The decisions which differentiate between ex parte and noticed orders reveal that a
hearing with notice provides a slight advantage for a union, disregarding all other factors:
relief granted	 relief denied
ex parte	 19	 3
notice	 16	 5
4" See note 437 supra.
436
 See note 437 supra.
4" See, e.g., Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99, 78 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2711-12 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
"' Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Only two days' notice, or shorter notice if the court permits, to
the party obtaining the temporary order is required. Id.
442 Id.
441 Id.
444 See, e.g., Parade Publications, Inc. v. Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369, 372-73, 80
L.R.R.M. 2264, 2266 (3d Cir. 1972).
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gate the complainant's factual allegations except through affidavits
or in a summary hearing.
3. Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions
On the return date of the order to show cause, the court will
determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, protecting the
petitioner's rights pending ultimate resolution of the litigation. The
pleading and evidentiary requirements for a preliminary injunction
are less stringent than those for a permanent injunction, since the
plaintiff is required to make only a prima facie showing that there
has been an invasion of his rights and that injunctive relief is the
necessary remedy. 445 In Granny Goose, the Supreme Court held that
Rule 65(a) requires notice affording "a fair opportunity to oppose the
application and to prepare for such opposition," 446 and implied that
five days' notice may be required. 447
After a final hearing on the merits, the court will grant or deny
the prayer for a permanent injunction. In a Boys Markets case,
however, the court is expressly precluded from considering the
merits of the dispute, since that function is reserved for the arbi-
trator. Many courts have viewed their role at the permanent injunc-
tion stage as limited to determining whether the prima facie ele-
ments of Boys Markets have been shown, with the ultimate deter-
mination of a number of key elements, including arbitrability, left to
the arbitrator. Thus, the role of a court issuing a permanent injunc-
tion should be treated as essentially identical to the normal role of a
court issuing a preliminary injunction. That role is to preserve the
status quo pending resolution of the merits of a dispute, with the
only real distinction being that the merits will be tried before an
arbitrator after a Boys Markets permanent injunction and not before
the court which issues a preliminary injunction.
Furthermore, in labor disputes, a preliminary iniunction often
permanently defeats a strike. As a result, whenever a preliminary
injunction is sought the defendant must be given a full evidentiary
hearing on the propriety of relief under both section 7 448 and Rule
65(a). 449
445
 See, e.g., Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 1945).
446
 415 U.S. at 434 n.7. Section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act also requires notice to the
adverse party. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
447 See 415 U.S. at 434 n.7, citing C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil § 2949, at 468 (1973 ed.).
449
 Detroit & T. S. Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 357 F.2d
152, 153-54, 61 L,R.R.M. 2388, 2389 (6th Cir. 1966).
449
 See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1269-70 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971); Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1947). See also
Marshall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353, 356 n.4, 357-58
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4. Appeal
District court orders involving permanent's° and interlocutory
(i.e., preliminary)451 injunctions may be appealed. As a general rule
the grant or denial of a temporary restraining order is not appeal-
able. 452
On appeal, the court must consider three factors. The court
must determine whether the district court's findings of fact are
"clearly erroneous."453 The court must also determine whether the
district court has applied the pertinent rule of law. 454 Finally, where
relief is discretionary (as in all Boys Markets injunction cases), the
appellate court must determine whether the district court has
abused its equitable discretion. 455
A key consideration in the appellate process is the time neces-
sary to perfect an appeal and secure a decision. In labor disputes,
the initial grant of relief may be practically decisive and an appeal
futile. Recognizing the need for speed, Congress provided that ap-
peals involving application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act should be
decided "with the greatest possible expedition." 456 and directed ap-
pellate courts to give "the proceedings precedence over all other
matter except older matters of the same character."457 Appellate
courts have not consistently followed that mandate. In one case, the
appellate decision was rendered five days after the initial district
court order. 458 In others, 500 days elapsed. 459
V. THE VIEW FROM THE LABOR BAR
The reported cases provide an incomplete picture of Boys Mar-
kets' impact upon the practice of labor law. This article has
(5th Cir. 1971); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 872
n,5 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1968); Ross-Whitney Corp, v.
Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1958).
456 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,
416 F.2d 368, 369, 72 L.R.R.M. 2527, 2528 (9th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S.
235, 253 (1970).
451 28 U.S.C.	 1292(a)(1) (1970). See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. Illinois Conf.
of Teamsters, 454 F.2d 1324, 1327, 79 L.R.R.M. 2555, 2557 (7th Cir. 1972).
432 See, e.g., Morning Tel. v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99, 80 L.R.R.M. 2710, 2711-12 (2d
Cir.' 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
433
 Fed, R. Civ. P, 52(a).
454 Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 832 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
433 Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); see Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
436 29 U.S.C.	 110 (1970).
457 Id.
456 United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 74 L.R.R.M. 2611 (3d Cir. 1970).
459
 See, e.g., Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Union, 459 F.2d 369 (3d
Cir. 1972).
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analyzed the more than one hundred court decisions reported as of
April 1, 1975. Yet, these cases represent merely the tip of the
iceberg. Several attorneys responding to a survey one year earlier
reported that they had personally participated in approximately one
hundred Boys Markets type of controversies. 46 °
The impact of Boys Markets extends far beyond litigated cases
to encompass the practical considerations in the decisional process of
the labor practitioner and his clients. For example, the survey
revealed hundreds of instances where the threat of a restraining
order or injunction stopped a strike or threatened strike. In innum-
erable situations the threat of injunctive relief is not explicit: forty
percent of the union attorneys responding indicated that they would
not recommend a strike where the employer could obtain Boys
Markets relief and 27.5 percent would not recommend a strike
where the employer might be able to obtain an injunction. Thus,
Boys Markets has a noticeable deterrent effect even in marginal
situations. On the other hand, in many situations the threat of a
strike may have prevented an employer from taking unilateral ac-
tion until a union's objections could be arbitrated. According to the
union attorneys surveyed, some of these employers either feared
employee resentment fanned by court interference or felt they could
not survive preinjunction damages. To a certain extent, these
employers may also have realized that the court might order restora-
tion of the status quo after issuing the injunction. 461 One union
attorney stated that he would recommend a strike even where the
right to an injunction is clear, if he felt the court would also order
the employer to restore the status quo pending arbitration.
Boys Markets may have a permanent effect upon the scope of
arbitration clauses bargained for by unions and employers. Approx-
imately 74 percent of the union attorneys and 85 percent of the
management attorneys indicated that Boys Markets had affected
their recommendations concerning the desirable scope of no-strike
and arbitration clauses. Surprisingly, more than 15 percent of the
union attorneys affected now recommend broader arbitration
clauses. Slightly more than half now recommend narrower arbitra-
tion clauses. Several commented that the scope of arbitration must
depend upon the relative strengths of the parties. On the other
hand, fewer than one in every ten management attorneys affected
by Boys Markets now recommends a narrower arbitration clause.
Several management attorneys now advise against clauses permit-
4" The computer print-out analyzing the data is available for inspection at the offices of
the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review. Participants in the survey were
guaranteed anonymity.
441
 See text at notes 333-47 supra.
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ting the employer to invoke the grievance procedure, lest a court
order the employer to arbitrate his dispute with the union. How-
ever, another management attorney saw a major trend toward
explicit arbitrability of employer grievances, commenting that ex-
pansion of the scope of arbitrable issues outweighs any hazard of
being subject to a suit for injunctive relief.
It is difficult to reconcile this widespread union acceptance of
the Boys Markets concept with their adamant opposition to particu-
lar injunctions. Other values apparently outweigh the historic union
fear of government by injunction. Foremost, of course, is the ap-
preciation of the benefits of arbitration in resolving labor disputes.
Union-sponsored litigation is largely responsible for arbitration's
high stature in the national labor policy and unions are apparently
very hesitant to forfeit those victories merely because of the Boys
Markets decision. Secondarily, however, a substantial 41.9 percent
of union attorneys admit that Boys Markets may be an effective tool
for achieving a stable industrial relationship through which both
union and management can prosper. In addition, 36 percent of
union attorneys agreed with the Supreme Court's assumption that
there is "no substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. "462
One-third agree with the Court's assumption that an injunction is
less disruptive than a damage action. 463 In fact, two attorneys, one
of whom represents an international union involved in several Boys
Markets actions, viewed a damage action as a much more serious
threat to a union than a suit for injunctive relief. Slightly more than
one-third of union attorneys felt that an injunction is less abrasive
than the discharge or discipline of individual strikers. On the other
hand, an injunction does not preclude the employer's utilization of
the traditional remedies. Many management attorneys wrote that an
injunction without discipline and a damage action would merely
invite repeated strikes. Moreover, a partner in a management firm
involved in more than 100 Boys Markets situations commented that
the mangement response to an illegal strike should be as abrasive as
possible.
Union attorneys are also discussing revisions of the no-strike-
arbitration system to avoid a NAPA-Monongahela injunction, where
the arbitral issue is the scope of the no-strike clause or the picket
line reservation. A union may seek to eliminate the no-strike clause
entirely, hoping that the bargaining history will negate the presump-
tion of an implied no-strike clause. Another suggestion would con-
tractually prohibit the employer from seeking an ex parte injunc-
tion. A third possibility would exclude picket line disputes from the
462 Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248.
463
 Id.
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arbitration system. There, however, the union would lose the ability
to arbitrate the propriety of discipline imposed upon "sympathy
strikers." A final possibility is a clause requiring an employer who
feels that a union is violating the no-strike or picket line clause to
submit the issue to immediate arbitration, and stipulating that,
pending resolution of this grievance, the activity shall be presumed
lawful and the emplOyer may not seek injunctive relief. This last
option might eliminate the unwarranted use of NAPA-Monongahela
injunctions, but might also eliminate Boys Markets injunctions by
always requiring an employer to exhaust his contractual remedies.
Unions will apparently choose another strategy to avoid injunc-
tion while retaining the benefits of arbitration. Three union attor-
neys of every five surveyed now recommend a narrower no-strike
clause. By expressly retaining the right to strike over a particular
grievance as well as the right to arbitrate it, a union can maximize
its options. No Boys Markets injunction should issue where the
union has explicitly refused to waive its right to strike, even if the
underlying dispute is arbitrable. 464
Because the scope of the arbitration clause is crucial to Boys
Markets, any factor affecting the arbitration clause will affect the
impact of Boys Markets. Dissenting in Collyer, Labor Board
Member Fanning predicted that "[m]any may decide they cannot
afford the luxury of .. . . 'voluntary' arbitration. "465 It is clear,
however, that Collyer has not had a major impact upon the negotia-
tion of arbitration clauses. Significantly, two-thirds of the union
attorneys reported that Collyer had not affected their recommenda-
tions. Those union attorneys affected by Collyer divide almost
evenly between advising broader and narrower arbitration clauses.
Slightly more than 42 percent of management attorneys were af-
fected by Collyer. These attorneys divided almost 4.5 to 1 in favor
of a broader arbitration clause.
Approximately one-sixth of the union attorneys affected would
seek an arbitration clause incorporating the unfair labor practice
language of the NLRA in order to require the arbitration of all
unfair labor practice claims. Suprisingly, only 10 percent of man-
agement attorneys would seek such a clause, although one firm
stated it would be more receptive to union requests. More than 41
percent of the union attorneys affected would seek a clause exclud-
ing unfair labor practice allegations from arbitration. The union
reaction is quite surprising considering the sharp criticism Collyer
has drawn from union attorneys. Perhaps unions realize that the
long term advantages of arbitration outweigh the disadvantages of
464
	
id. at 254.
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 847, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937 (1971).
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deferral. Unions may also prefer their limited control over the
arbitration process to the vagaries of an employer-dominated Labor
Board. As one union attorney commented, "Mil the long run, how-
ever, we have always found more succor from an arbitrator than
from the Board."
An important factor leading to the reversal of Sinclair was the
Court's belief that a union's right to remove a section 301 case
would destroy state court jurisdiction unless federal courts could
also enjoin strikes in breach of contract. 466 If there is any vitality
left in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, unions should still seek removal to
obtain the greater protection afforded in federal court. In fact,
almost 95 percent of union attorneys do prefer to litigate Boys
Markets type cases in federal court. But, surprisingly, so do almost
66 percent of management attorneys. Thus, the pre-Norris-
LaGuardia race to federal court continues.
A wide variety of factors propel the labor practitioner into
federal court. Even management attorneys preferring to sue in state
court find the quality of judges higher in federal court. Management
attorneys like the speed and availability of ex parte orders in federal
court, although these same factors rate highest among those prefer-
ring state court. Significantly, many management attorneys wrote
that the availability and strength of the federal contempt power was
an important consideration; in fact, this "write-in" factor ranked
fourth among the management's hierarchy. As one management firm
commented, where management expects prompt compliance with a
court order, it will seek an ex parte state court order; but where
contempt may be necessary, it will litigate in federal court.
Union attorneys prefer federal court for the quality of the
judiciary and the federal requirement of an evidentiary hearing.
Significantly, however, the protections afforded by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act were far less important than the quality of the
judiciary in influencing union attorneys in the choice of forum.
VI. CONCLUSION
Four and one half years ago, the Supreme Court limited the
Magna Carta of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by holding that under
certain circumstances federal district courts may enjoin strikes in
breach of contract. An analysis of court decisions under Boys Mar-
kets and a survey of labor law practitioners reveal that the early
union fear that the Court had reopened the door to government by
injunction was largely unwarranted. Undoubtedly, the federal
judiciary has matured considerably in the last third of a century.
466 Bays Markets, 398 U.S. at 245-47.
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Nonetheless, courts have generally shown great sensitivity to-
ward management; the courts assume that any strike causes irrepar-
able injury to the employer, but that employer unilateral actions and
discipline rarely cause irreparable injury to a union or its members.
Courts seem acutely aware that a strike may damage an employer's
reputation, but unable to realize that a union must often protect its
own image when provoked and must appear to act dramatically or
lose the support of its present and potential membership. On the
other hand, the Boys Markets injunction does allow a union to
dramatize its displeasure yet limit its financial liability for the result-
ing breach of contract.
At the same time, some courts appear slightly over-zealous in
their regard for the arbitration system. Many courts are unwilling to
scrutinize the facts to determine whether a dispute is actually arbi-
trable before restraining a strike. Others have sought imaginative
rationales to convert an arbitrable issue into a union's grievance in
order to enjoin a strike. Here, too, the Supreme Court's guidelines
promote the cavalier !issuance of injunctions: the presumption of
arbitrability masks superficial analysis and the Court's tacit accep-
tance of the picket line injunction obliterates the distinction between
arbitrable issues and grievances.
Furthermore, several courts have largely ignored many of the
procedural protections' of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In particular,
district courts have gianted ex parte orders without explicitly con-
sidering whether a short delay to notify union counsel would ir-
reparably injure the employer. Unless the courts demonstrate great-
er skepticism toward the employer's complaint, the presence of
opposing counsel is necessary to prevent improper restraint. Perhaps
Granny Goose and several appellate court decisions signal a return
to stricter conformity with the procedural safeguards.
Courts applying Boys Markets have generally shown less regard
for the rights of individual employees than for the needs of the union
and employer. Several courts, for example, have promoted stability
at the cost of stifling internal union opposition to a particular con-
tract. Others have rejected the distinction between a wildcat and a
union action, further binding employees to their union. The result of
that conclusion is that employees can force a union to arbitrate their
grievances by striking, thus decreasing union control over the use of
the arbitration system and possibly increasing the danger of union
breaches of the duty of fair representation. Courts should weigh the
rights of individual employees when balancing the equities between
unions and employers.,
On the whole, however, district courts have demonstrated con-
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siderably more care than most union attorneys would have predicted
five years ago. Moreover, a union willing to pursue an appeal will
almost uniformly obtain delayed but eventual vindication. The pick-
et line cases apparently provide the sole exception to the rule, for
there appellate court reversals have promoted the issuance of in-
junctions.
Boys Markets also provides a union with several useful oppor-
tunities. In many situations, a union can strike to obtain previously
unavailable conditional protective orders requiring the cessation of
employer conduct pending arbitration of a dispute. Unions may also
strike, assuming that to obtain an injunction an employer will agree
to arbitrate previously nonarbitrable issues. Perhaps most usefully,
Boys Markets provides a helpful safety valve, releasing employee
tensions, while simultaneously leading to arbitration of the underly-
ing dispute.
By characterizing its holding as "narrow," the Court clearly
misconstrued the impact of the Boys Markets decision. There are
almost as many reported Boys Markets injunctions as there were
reported federal injunctions in the first 27 years of the century—the
pre-Norris-LaGuardia era. Yet, the nature of the injunctions differs
remarkably. Only in the picket line cases do courts interfere with
union organizing campaigns. There is no massive, repressive use of
the injunction to undermine unionism. Instead, courts have granted
equitable relief which, with few exceptions, merely obligates unions
to comply with voluntarily negotiated agreements to arbitrate. Cer-
tain changes in the scope of arbitration may well occur as segments
of management attempt to broaden the arbitration clause to obtain
increased protection against strikes and, conversely, some unions
seek a narrower clause. But these countervailing pressures will not
produce drastic changes in the arbitration process. Arbitration will
retain its preeminent status in the national labor policy, and with
certain exceptions, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and a mature, impar-
tial judiciary will protect unions against unwarranted injunctions.
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